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We explore a new dimension of fund managers' timing ability by examining whether they
can time market liquidity through adjusting their portfolios' market exposure as aggregate
liquidity conditions change. Using a large sample of hedge funds, we find strong evidence
of liquidity timing. A bootstrap analysis suggests that top-ranked liquidity timers cannot
be attributed to pure luck. In out-of-sample tests, top liquidity timers outperform bottom
timers by 4.0–5.5% annually on a risk-adjusted basis. We also find that it is important to
distinguish liquidity timing from liquidity reaction, which primarily relies on public
information. Our results are robust to alternative explanations, hedge fund data biases,
and the use of alternative timing models, risk factors, and liquidity measures. The findings
highlight the importance of understanding and incorporating market liquidity conditions
in investment decision making.
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by examining whether fund managers adjust their market
exposure based on a market return forecast. Subsequently,
many other measures have been proposed for identifying
market return-timing and volatility-timing skills, e.g.,
Henriksson and Merton (1981), Jagannathan and Korajczyk
(1986), Grinblatt and Titman (1989), Ferson and Schadt
(1996), Busse (1999), Jiang, Yao, and Yu (2007), and Chen,
Ferson, and Peters (2010).
In this paper, we explore a new dimension of fund
managers' timing ability—their ability to time market
liquidity.1 In particular, we ask the following questions:
Can hedge fund managers, among the most sophisticated
of investors, time market liquidity by strategically adjust-
ing fund betas based on their forecasts of future market
liquidity conditions? If so, how much economic value does
liquidity-timing skill bring to fund investors? These issues
are essential to an understanding of the role of market
liquidity in professional fund management.
Market-wide liquidity represents an important dimension
of market conditions. Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) and
Acharya and Pedersen (2005) show that market liquidity,
which captures the aggregate ease of transacting a large
quantity of assets in a short time without incurring high
costs, is a priced state variable important for asset pricing. As
underscored by the 2008–2009 financial crisis, market liquid-
ity deteriorates when many investors exit the market at the
same time, which causes more liquidation that further
reduces market liquidity through so-called liquidity spirals.
Therefore, a savvy manager who can correctly forecast
market-wide liquidity deterioration would naturally wish to
reduce his fund's market exposure before the event occurs.
We examine hedge funds' liquidity-timing ability for
several reasons. First, hedge funds are managed by highly
sophisticated managers and have experienced dramatic
growth in the past two decades.2 Over that period, many
talented managers have joined the industry and hence, it is
natural to ask whether hedge fundmanagers have the skills to
time market conditions.3 Second, liquidity is crucial to hedge
funds. Since the collapse of Long-Term Capital Management
(LTCM) in 1998, the interaction between liquidity at various
levels (asset, funding, and market liquidity) and traders such
as hedge funds has become better understood. Though other
levels of liquidity (e.g., funding liquidity) perhaps are equally
important (e.g., Aragon and Strahan, 2012), we focus on
market-wide liquidity because timing strategies are essen-
tially about aggregate market conditions. Third, hedge funds
often employ dynamic strategies and have time-varying
market exposure (e.g., Fung and Hsieh, 1997, 2001; and
Patton and Ramadorai, forthcoming). The combination of
time-varying market exposure and the importance of market
liquidity implies that hedge funds provide an ideal platform
to study liquidity-timing ability. Finally, given the evidence1 In this paper, we refer to aggregate equity market liquidity simply
as “market liquidity.”
2 According to estimates of Hedge Fund Research Inc., the hedge fund
industry has grown from a few hundred funds managing less than $50
billion in the early 1990s to more than 9,000 funds managing more than
$2 trillion by the end of 2010.
3 We use “hedge funds” and “hedge fund managers” interchangeably.of positive risk-adjusted performance among hedge funds
(e.g., Ackermann, McEnally, and Ravenscraft, 1999; Brown,
Goetzmann, and Ibbotson, 1999; Fung, Hsieh, Naik, and
Ramadorai, 2008; and Jagannathan, Malakhov, and Novikov,
2010), it is reasonable to ask whether liquidity timing is one
source of the superior performance.
We build on the Treynor-Mazuy framework to explore
the dynamics of hedge funds' market exposure in relation
to market liquidity conditions, which is based on the
relation between a fund's beta determined in month t
and the market's return in month t+1. We estimate a
regression model to evaluate how a fund's beta in month t
changes with market liquidity realized in month t+1 (e.g.,
proxied by the Pástor-Stambaugh liquidity measure), while
controlling for the fund's exposures to other relevant
factors. If fund beta varies positively with market liquidity
conditions, it indicates successful liquidity timing, i.e., the
fund has relatively high (low) market exposure in antici-
pation of conditions where market liquidity is good (poor).
Given the increasing importance of liquidity concerns in
asset management, our investigation makes an important
contribution to the hedge fund and timing literatures.
Using a large sample of 5,298 equity-oriented hedge
funds (including funds of funds) over the period 1994–
2009, we evaluate liquidity-timing ability at the individual
fund level, which allows us to distinguish top liquidity-
timing funds from the rest. We focus on fund managers'
ability to time aggregate equity market liquidity because
most hedge funds bear significant exposure to equity
markets. For funds with at least 36 consecutive non-
missing monthly observations, we estimate the timing
skill using the fund's monthly returns. To assess statistical
significance of timing ability and to separate timing skill
from luck, we conduct a bootstrap analysis. For each cross-
sectional statistic of the timing coefficients (e.g., the 10th
percentile of t-statistics across all funds), we compare the
actual estimate with the corresponding distribution of the
statistics based on bootstrapped pseudo-funds that share
similar risk exposure as actual funds but, by construction,
have no timing skill. The findings strongly suggest that
liquidity timing ability exists among hedge funds, and top-
ranked liquidity timers cannot be attributed to pure luck.
Next, we explore the economic significance of liquidity
timing by examining out-of-sample alphas (i.e., risk-
adjusted returns) for the portfolios of funds at different
levels of liquidity-timing skill. Specifically, in each month
we sort funds into ten decile portfolios based on their
liquidity-timing coefficients estimated from the previous
36 months. Then, we measure out-of-sample alphas of the
portfolios for different holding periods ranging from three
to 12 months. The results suggest that liquidity-timing
skill generates significant abnormal returns. For example,
over a six-month holding period, the decile portfolio
consisting of top liquidity timers delivers an out-of-
sample alpha of 0.63% per month (or 7.6% per year), which
is more than three times the alpha of the portfolio of
bottom timers (0.19% per month). The spread in out-of-
sample alphas between the top and bottom liquidity
timers remains significant even 12 months after form-
ing the portfolios. We also find evidence of persistence
in liquidity-timing skill, consistent with Jagannathan,
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persistence among superior hedge funds. Taken together,
the results suggest that liquidity timing represents man-
agerial skill adding value to fund investors.
Furthermore, we develop a test to distinguish liquidity-
timing skill from liquidity reaction that captures fund
managers' change in market exposure after observing
market liquidity in the previous month. Interestingly,
despite strong evidence of liquidity reaction, the test
reveals no economic value as top liquidity reactors fail to
deliver larger alphas than other funds in out-of-sample
tests. This result is intuitive because liquidity reaction,
using public information solely, does not represent man-
agerial skill. Hence, it is important to distinguish liquidity
timing from liquidity reaction.
Given that hedge funds' market exposures can change
for other reasons, we conduct a wide array of additional
tests to gain deeper insights about liquidity timing among
hedge funds. First, under deteriorated market liquidity
conditions, some hedge funds face margin calls and
investor redemptions, requiring them to reduce market
exposure (e.g., Lo, 2008). To address this concern due to
funding constraint, we examine liquidity timing among
funds that do not use leverage, impose strict redemption
restrictions, or have low fund-flow volatility. Second,
considering that large funds' simultaneous sales of assets
can affect market liquidity (e.g., Khandani and Lo, 2007),
we perform tests for small funds whose trades are unlikely
to impact overall market liquidity. Finally, we conduct tests
using alternative timing model specifications, risk factors,
and liquidity measures. Overall, our findings are robust to
all these investigations
The seminal works of Fung and Hsieh (1997, 2000)
have shown various biases in hedge fund data, including
survivorship bias, backfilling bias, and selection bias. We
make efforts to minimize the impact of the biases on our
inference about liquidity-timing skill. We use both live and
defunct funds to mitigate the impact of survivorship bias.
Hedge fund data also suffer from backfill bias that arises as
a hedge fund could choose not to report to the database
from its inception but backfill its historical performance
later when it has established a successful record. To
evaluate the impact of backfill bias, we discard the return
observations before the funds are added to the database
and repeat the tests for liquidity timing. Finally, Fund and
Hsieh (2000) point out that data of funds of funds in
general contain less bias compared with those of hedge
funds. In this paper, we examine liquidity timing ability for
both hedge funds and funds of funds. The results suggest
that the inference about liquidity timing appears robust to
the data biases.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In
Section 2, we outline our liquidity-timing model, and
in Section 3 we describe the data. Section 4 presents the
empirical results concerning liquidity-timing ability and
distinguishes between liquidity timing and liquidity
reaction. Section 5 explores alternative explanations
related to funding liquidity and investor redemptions.
Section 6 addresses the impact of hedge fund data biases
on our inference. In Section 7, we check the robustness
of our results to alternative model specifications, riskfactors, and market liquidity measures. Finally, Section 8
concludes.
2. Liquidity timing model
Our liquidity-timing model builds on the pioneering
work of Treynor and Mazuy (1966). In general, a timing
model can be understood based on the capital asset
pricing model (CAPM), by assuming that a fund manager
generates portfolio returns according to the process
rp;tþ1 ¼ αp þ βp;tMKTtþ1 þ up;tþ1; t ¼ 0;…; T−1; ð1Þ
where rp,t+1 is the return in excess of the risk-free rate
(proxied by the one-month Treasury bill rate) for fund p in
month t+1 and MKTt+1 is the excess return on the market
portfolio. In Eq. (1), the fund's market beta varies over
time. The timeline in Eq. (1) follows the timing literature,
in which the fund beta βp,t is set by the manager in month
t based on his forecast about market conditions in month
t+1. Various timing models differ in the dimensions of the
market conditions they concentrate on. Market timing
focuses on forecasts of market returns, while volatility
timing stresses the importance of forecasts of market
volatility. In this paper, we test for liquidity-timing skill
and focus on forecasts of market liquidity.
Existing timing models (e.g., Admati, Bhattacharya,
Ross, and Pfleiderer, 1986; and Ferson and Schadt, 1996)
approximate the timer's market beta as a linear function of
his forecast about market conditions. The linear functional
form can be justified from a Taylor expansion by ignoring
higher-order terms (e.g., Shanken, 1990). Accordingly, the
generic form of such a specification is
βp;t ¼ βp þ γpEðmarket conditiontþ1jItÞ; ð2Þ
where It is the information set available to the fund
manager in t. The coefficient γ captures the essence of
timing skill, i.e., how market beta varies with forecasts
about market conditions. Although prior research on
timing skill examines market conditions such as market
returns and volatility, we explore a new dimension of
timing ability, namely, the ability to time market liquidity.
Hence, we specify Eq. (2) as
βp;t ¼ βp þ γpðLm;tþ1−Lm þ υtþ1Þ; ð3Þ
where the expression in parentheses represents the man-
ager's forecast (i.e., timing signal) about market liquidity
and Lm,t+1 is the measure of market liquidity in month t+1.
As it is unrealistic for a timer to have a perfect signal, υt+1
denotes a forecast noise unknown until t+1, which we
assume to be independent with a zero mean. Following
the timing literature (e.g., Ferson and Schadt, 1996; and
Busse, 1999), we de-mean the manager's signal by sub-
tracting Lm for ease of interpretation. Accordingly, βp
captures the fund's average beta approximately. Our infer-
ence about liquidity-timing ability is unaffected with or
without de-meaning the liquidity signal.
Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) develop a market-wide
liquidity measure and show that market liquidity is an
important state variable for asset prices. Liquid markets
are generally viewed as accommodating large quantities of
transactions in a short time with little impact on asset
4 Our inference remains unchanged when we impose other AUM
filters (e.g., $5 million or $20 million). For non-US dollar—denominated
funds, we convert their assets under management to US dollar values
using exchange rates in the corresponding months. For robustness, we
also convert fund returns into US dollar values and our inference about
liquidity timing is unaffected.
5 We experiment with alternative filters (e.g., requiring a minimum
of 24-month observations) and find that our inference is robust to this
parameter.
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liquidity associated with temporary price fluctuations
induced by order flow, which can be interpreted as
volume-related price reversals attributable to liquidity
effects. The measure is based on the assumption that the
less liquid a stock is, the greater the expected price
reversal is for a given amount of order flow. In this paper,
we mainly use the Pástor-Stambaugh liquidity measure,
and we use the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure to
cross-validate our results. The Pástor-Stambaugh and
Amihud measures have been shown to capture market-
wide liquidity conditions well. The Appendix A provides
details on the construction of the two measures.
We obtain the following liquidity-timing model by
substituting Eq. (3) in Eq. (1) and incorporating the
forecast noise υ within the error term:
rp;tþ1 ¼ αp þ βpMKTtþ1 þ γpMKTtþ1ðLm;tþ1−LmÞ þ εp;tþ1: ð4Þ
The liquidity-timing model in Eq. (4) is parallel to
the existing models of market timing [i.e., βp;t ¼ βpþ
γpðMTKtþ1 þ υtþ1Þ] and volatility timing [i.e., βp;t ¼ βpþ
γpðVoltþ1−Vol þ υtþ1Þ], except that the market condition
considered here is market liquidity. A positive timing
coefficient γ indicates that the fund has a high (low)
market beta during good (poor) market liquidity
conditions.
It is well known that hedge funds often follow dynamic
trading strategies (e.g., Fung and Hsieh, 1997, 2001; and
Mitchell and Pulvino, 2001) and use derivatives (e.g., Chen,
2011). Hence, traditional factors based on linear payoffs
might not be well suited for examining hedge fund
performance. In this paper, we estimate liquidity-timing
ability for hedge funds using the seven-factor model
proposed by Fung and Hsieh (2004) as the main bench-
mark model. The seven factors include both linear and
option-like factors and have been shown to explain the
variations in hedge fund returns well. Specifically,
the factors are an equity market factor, a size factor, the
monthly change in the yield of the ten-year Treasury,
the monthly change in the spread between Moody's Baa
bond and the ten-year Treasury yields, and three trend-
following factors for bonds, currencies, and commodities.
Among the factors, equity market exposure is the most
important for equity-oriented hedge funds. Thus, we test
for liquidity-timing ability by examining the changes in
equity market exposure in this paper, and we leave the
investigation of potential changes in other market expo-
sures for future research. Our baseline liquidity-timing
model has the specification
rp;tþ1 ¼ αp þ βpMKTtþ1 þ γpMKTtþ1ðLm;tþ1−LmÞ
þ ∑
J
j ¼ 1
βjf j;tþ1 þ εp;tþ1; ð5Þ
where f denotes the other factors besides the equity
market factor (J¼6 in this case). The coefficient γ measures
liquidity-timing ability. For robustness, we also use alter-
native benchmark factor models to measure liquidity-
timing skill (see Section 7).3. The data
In this section, we describe the data on the hedge fund
sample, the Pástor-Stambaugh liquidity measure, the Ami-
hud illiquidity measure, and the Fung and Hsieh seven
factors.3.1. Hedge fund sample
We employ a sample of hedge funds from the Lipper
TASS (hereafter TASS) database, which constitutes one of
the most extensive hedge fund data sources and has been
widely used in the hedge fund literature. Although the
database contains fund returns back to November 1977,
it does not retain dead funds until 1994 and data from the
early period contain survivorship bias. Thus, we focus on
the period from January 1994 onward. Following the hedge
fund literature, we include only funds that report net-of-
fee returns on a monthly basis and with average assets
under management (AUM) of at least $10 million.4 Fung
and Hsieh (1997, 2000) provide an excellent summary of
biases in hedge fund data, such as survivorship bias,
backfill bias, and selection bias. We evaluate the impact
of these biases on the inference about liquidity timing in
Section 6.
TASS classifies hedge funds into ten strategy categories:
convertible arbitrage, dedicated short bias, emerging
markets, equity market neutral, event-driven, fixed
income arbitrage, global macro, long-short equity, mana-
ged futures, and multi-strategy. Funds of funds are treated
as a separate category. As most hedge funds trade primar-
ily in equity markets, we focus our investigation on equity-
oriented strategies by dropping fixed income arbitrage and
managed futures. To draw reliable inference, we require
each category to contain a sufficient number of individual
funds. Consequently, dedicated short bias funds are elimi-
nated because of the small number of funds in that
category.
Our final sample contains 5,298 equity-oriented funds
over the sample period of 1994–2009, of which 2,220 are
funds of funds and 3,078 are hedge funds in the strategy
categories of convertible arbitrage, emerging market,
equity market neutral, event-driven, global macro, long-
short equity, and multi-strategy. Among the sample funds,
2,266 are alive as of the end of the sample period and
3,032 became defunct during the period. We require each
fund to have at least 36 monthly returns to obtain mean-
ingful results.5
Panel A of Table 1 summarizes monthly returns for the
sample funds. Over the sample period, the average
monthly return for all funds is 0.62% (about 7.4% per year)
C. Cao et al. / Journal of Financial Economics 109 (2013) 493–516 497with a standard deviation of 0.66%. Hedge funds exhibit
higher average monthly return (0.82%) than funds of funds
(0.34%). Fung and Hsieh (2000) point out two factors that
can explain this difference in average returns: Funds of
funds charge investors with operating expenses and man-
agement fees on top of the fees charged by underlying
hedge funds, and funds of funds often hold some cash to
meet potential redemptions. Both factors suggest that
funds of funds have lower net-of-fee returns than hedge
funds on average. In addition, Fung and Hsieh (2000)
argue that funds of funds generally contain less survivor-
ship bias and backfill bias than hedge funds. Among
different fund strategies, emerging market has the highest
average monthly return of 1.07%, and convertible arbitrage
delivers the lowest average monthly return of 0.60%.
Meanwhile, convertible arbitrage has the lowest return
volatility.7 We are grateful to David Hsieh for making the data of bond,
currency and commodity trend-following factors available from http://
faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/_dah7/DataLibrary/TF-FAC.xls. The data of the
other factor are from the Center for Research in Security Prices and the
Federal Reserve Bank databases.
8 Negative timing seems hard to interpret because it suggests that
the manager changes fund beta in the opposite direction to what is
suggested by successful liquidity timing. However, as shown in Section3.2. Liquidity and factor data
In Panel B of Table 1, we report summary statistics of
the Pástor-Stambaugh market liquidity measure and the
Amihud illiquidity measure during 1994–2009.6 The time
series mean (median) of the Pástor-Stambaugh market
liquidity is −3.26% (−2.49%), suggesting a 3.26% average
liquidity cost for a $1 million trade in 1962 stock market
dollars distributed equally across stocks. For the period
1994–2009, we find that the value of $1 million in 1962
stock market dollars is equivalent to approximately $27
million, and the average daily trading volume is about $29
million for stocks on the NYSE and Amex. Based on this
comparison, we interpret the 3.26% average liquidity
measure as the cost for a trade size roughly as large as
the average daily volume.
The liquidity measure has a standard deviation of 7.80%
per month, indicating considerable variation of market-
wide liquidity over time and potential importance of
taking aggregate liquidity conditions into account in
investment management. The time series of the market
liquidity measure reveals some interesting patterns.
As shown in Fig. 1, substantial downward spikes in market
liquidity occur around October 1997 (the Asian financial
crisis), September 1998 (the turmoil of the LTCM), April
2000 (the burst of Internet bubble), October 2007 (the
beginning of the recent financial crisis), and March 2008
(the bankruptcy of Bear Sterns). Thus, this measure cap-
tures well-known market liquidity shocks very well, even
beyond the period examined in Pástor and Stambaugh
(2003). The mean (median) of the Amihud illiquid mea-
sure is 1.09% (1.00%), which suggests an average price
impact of 1.09% for a $1 million trade in 1962 stock market
dollars distributed equally across stocks. Although the two
liquidity measures focus on different aspects of market
liquidity, they often identify months corresponding to the
well-known low-liquidity episodes.6 We thank Lubos Pástor and Robert Stambaugh for making the
Pástor-Stambaugh liquidity measure data available at http://faculty.
chicagobooth.edu/lubos.pastor/research.Panel B of Table 1 also presents summary statistics for
the Fung and Hsieh seven factors.7 The average market
excess return is 0.45% per month over 1994–2009 with a
standard deviation of 4.65%. During the period, the lowest
market return (−16.20%) occurs in August 1998, and the
highest return (8.18%) occurs in April 2003. The correlation
between market returns and the Pástor-Stambaugh mar-
ket liquidity is 0.23 over the sample period.
4. Empirical results on liquidity timing
In this section, we first present the cross-sectional
distribution of t-statistics for the liquidity-timing coeffi-
cients across individual funds. Then, we use a bootstrap
analysis to examine the statistical significance of timing
ability. Next, we show that liquidity-timing skill is asso-
ciated with economically significant risk-adjusted returns
in out-of-sample tests and that the liquidity-timing skill is
persistent over time. Finally, we show that it is important
to distinguish liquidity-timing skill from liquidity reaction
that primarily relies on public information and, thus, does
not generate investment value.
4.1. Cross-sectional distribution of t-statistics for liquidity
timing
We evaluate liquidity-timing skill using regression
Eq. (5) for individual funds. To ensure a meaningful regression,
we require each fund to have at least 36 monthly observa-
tions. Table 2 reports the cross-sectional distribution of
t-statistics for liquidity-timing coefficients across individual
funds. In particular, the table shows the percentage of
t-statistics exceeding the indicated cutoff values. For example,
20.1% of the sample funds have t-statistics greater than 1.28.
For the overall sample, the right tails appear thicker than the
left tails. We also observe a higher proportion of t-statistics
greater than the cutoff values for hedge funds than for funds
of funds. Meanwhile, about 14.7% of the funds have t-statistics
smaller than −1.28, which indicates that some funds have
negative liquidity timing.8
Overall, the distribution of t-statistics suggests that
there exists liquidity timing skill based on the conven-
tional significance values under the normality assumption.
However, the conventional inference can be misleading
when we infer the cross section of test statistics for a
sample of hedge funds. First, due to their dynamic trading
strategies (e.g., Fung and Hsieh, 1997, 2001), hedge fund
returns often do not follow normal distributions. Second,4.3, we do not find persistence in negative liquidity timing among hedge
funds, despite the evidence of persistence in successful liquidity timing
skill. Further, when we control for market and volatility timing, the
evidence of negative liquidity timing becomes weaker (see Section 7.2 for
details).
Table 1
Summary statistics of the data.
This table presents summary statistics of the data. Panel A summarizes average monthly returns on equity-oriented funds (all funds), hedge funds, funds
of funds, and funds in each strategy category. Returns are in percent per month. N is the number of funds that exist any time during the sample period.
Panel B summarizes the Pástor-Stambaugh market liquidity measure, the Amihud illiquidity measure, and the Fung-Hsieh seven factors, which are the
market excess return (MKT), a size factor (SMB), monthly change in the ten-year treasury constant maturity yield (YLDCHG), monthly change in the
Moody's Baa yield less ten-year treasury constant maturity yield (BAAMTSY), and three trend-following factors: PFTSBD (bond), PFTSFX (currency), and
PFTSCOM (commodity). The Pástor-Stambaugh liquidity (the Amihud illiquidity) measure is the average liquidity cost (price impact) in percent for a $1
million trade in 1962 stock market dollars distributed equally across all stocks on the NYSE and Amex. The sample period is from January 1994 to
December 2009.
Variables N Mean Median Standard deviation 25% 75%
Panel A: Summary of average fund returns
Equity-oriented funds (all funds) 5298 0.620 0.533 0.667 0.257 0.892
Hedge funds 3078 0.820 0.748 0.741 0.428 1.143
Funds of funds 2220 0.343 0.343 0.408 0.136 0.538
Convertible arbitrage 142 0.600 0.576 0.430 0.376 0.806
Emerging market 340 1.068 0.947 0.962 0.540 1.543
Equity market neutral 239 0.522 0.470 0.489 0.216 0.780
Event-driven 408 0.793 0.751 0.703 0.485 1.010
Global macro 177 0.774 0.732 0.872 0.438 1.100
Long-short equity 1465 0.890 0.819 0.708 0.508 1.220
Multi-strategy 307 0.614 0.545 0.721 0.185 0.913
Panel B: Summary of liquidity measures and factor data
Pástor-Stambaughliquidity −3.262 −2.490 7.796 −6.566 1.188
Amihud illiquidity 1.093 1.001 0.268 0.911 1.194
MKT 0.446 1.155 4.652 −2.330 3.480
SMB 0.194 −0.175 3.743 −2.120 2.360
YLDCHG −0.010 −0.010 0.283 −2.000 0.160
BAAMTSY 0.003 0.000 0.228 −0.090 0.080
PTFSBD −1.384 −4.821 14.730 −11.320 3.921
PTFSFX 0.194 −4.306 19.820 −13.380 9.281
PTFSCOM −0.314 −2.896 13.950 −9.627 5.998
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
M
ar
ke
t l
iq
ui
di
ty
Oct. 1997
Sep. 1998
April 2000
Oct. 2007
March 2008
Oct. 2008Oct. 2002
Fig. 1. Time series of monthly market liquidity. This figure plots the time
series of monthly market liquidity measure developed by Pástor and
Stambaugh (2003). The sample period is from January 1994 to December
2009. The noticeable downward spikes in market liquidity are associated with
months of October 1997 (the Asian financial crisis), September 1998 (the
height of Russian debt crisis and the collapse of Long-Term Capital Manage-
ment), April 2000 (the burst of internet bubble), October 2002 (when the
market dropped to a five-year low), October 2007 (the beginning of 2008–
2009 financial crisis), March 2008 (the Bear Sterns bankruptcy) and October
2008 (the collapse of Lehman Brothers). Anecdotal evidence from financial
press has identified these months in which liquidity was extremely low.
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of funds, it involves a multiple comparison problem.
By random chance, some funds appear to have significant
t-statistics under the conventional levels even if none of
the funds has true timing ability. Third, if fund returns
within a strategy are correlated, the timing measures mightnot be independent across funds. Therefore, we employ a
bootstrap analysis to assess the significance of the timing
coefficients. The bootstrap technique has the advantage to
answer the question of whether the estimated timing coeffi-
cients reflect true managerial skill or pure luck.
Before we discuss the bootstrap analysis in detail,
we take a look at the magnitude of the estimated timing
coefficients. The average γ coefficient of the top 10%
liquidity-timing funds is 2.14. To put this number into
perspective, we compare it with the average estimated
market beta (i.e., the coefficient on MKT) of the top 10%
timing funds, which is 0.39. A timing coefficient of 2.14
suggests that when market liquidity is 1 standard devia-
tion (i.e., 0.078 from Table 1) above its monthly mean,
ceteris paribus, the market beta of a typical top 10% timing
fund is higher by 0.17 (2.140.078), which translates to
about 44% of the average beta of 0.39 when the aggregate
liquidity is at its average level.
4.2. Bootstrap analysis
We now describe the bootstrap procedure used to
assess the statistical significance of liquidity-timing coeffi-
cients for individual hedge funds. Our bootstrap procedure
is similar to that of Kosowski, Timmermann, White, and
Wermers (2006), Chen and Liang (2007), Jiang, Yao, and Yu
(2007), Kosowski, Naik, and Teo (2007), and Fama and
French (2010), all building on Efron (1979). The basic idea
of the bootstrap analysis is that we randomly resample
data (e.g., regression residuals) to generate hypothetical
Table 2
Cross-sectional distribution of t-statistics for the liquidity-timing coefficient across individual funds.
This table summarizes the distribution of t-statistics for the liquidity-timing coefficient. For each fund with at least 36 monthly return observations,
we estimate the liquidity-timing model
rp;tþ1 ¼ αp þ βp;1MKTtþ1 þ γpMKTtþ1ðLm;tþ1−LmÞ þ βp;2SMBtþ1 þ βp;3YLDCHGtþ1 þ βp;4BAAMTSYtþ1
þβp;5PTFSBDtþ1 þ βp;6PTFSFXtþ1 þ βp;7PTFSCOMtþ1 þ εp;tþ1:
where rp,t+1 is the excess return on each individual fund in month t+1. The independent variables are the market excess return (MKT), a size factor (SMB),
monthly change in the ten-year Treasury constant maturity yield (YLDCHG), monthly change in the Moody's Baa yield less ten-year Treasury constant
maturity yield (BAAMTSY), and three trend-following factors: PFTSBD (bond), PFTSFX (currency), and PFTSCOM (commodity). Lm,t+1 is the market liquidity
measure in month t+1, and Lm is the mean level of market liquidity. The coefficient γ measures liquidity-timing ability. The t-statistics are
heteroskedasticity consistent. The numbers in the table report the percentage of funds with t-statistics of the timing coefficient exceeding the indicated
values.
Percentage of the funds
Category Number of funds t≤−2.326 t≤−1.960 t≤−1.645 t≤−1.282 t≥1.282 t≥1.645 t≥1.960 t≥2.326
All funds 5298 4.27 6.76 9.49 14.65 20.06 13.50 9.31 5.49
Hedge funds 3078 4.81 7.21 10.01 14.68 22.74 15.53 10.43 6.37
Fund of funds 2220 3.51 6.13 8.78 14.59 16.35 10.68 7.75 4.28
Convertible arbitrage 142 8.45 10.56 17.61 24.65 13.38 9.16 3.52 0.70
Emerging market 340 8.53 13.24 19.12 25.00 16.76 12.94 7.35 4.12
Equity market neutral 239 6.70 8.37 10.04 15.48 18.41 14.23 8.37 4.18
Event-driven 408 3.68 6.37 7.84 10.78 28.68 17.89 12.99 8.33
Global macro 177 3.95 4.52 6.78 10.73 24.86 12.43 7.91 3.96
Long/short equity 1465 3.96 5.73 7.85 11.95 24.51 16.86 11.95 7.65
Multi-strategy 307 3.58 7.82 11.40 18.57 19.54 14.66 9.45 6.19
C. Cao et al. / Journal of Financial Economics 109 (2013) 493–516 499funds that, by construction, have the same factor loadings
as the actual funds but have no timing ability, and then we
evaluate
if the t-statistics of the estimated timing coefficients for
the actual funds are different from the bootstrapped
distribution that assumes no timing ability. Our bootstrap
procedure has five steps.1. Estimate the liquidity-timing model for fund p:
rp;tþ1 ¼ αp þ βpMKTtþ1 þ γpMKTtþ1ðLm;tþ1−LmÞ
þ ∑
J
j ¼ 1
βjf j;tþ1 þ εp;tþ1; ð6Þ
and store the estimated coefficients {α^p;β^p;γ^p;…} as well
as the time series of residuals {ε^p;tþ1, t 0, …, Tp−1},
where Tp is the number of monthly observations for
fund p.2. Resample the residuals with replacement and obtain a
randomly resampled residual time series {ε^bp;tþ1}, where
b is the index of bootstrap iteration (b¼1, 2,…, B). Then,
generate monthly excess returns for a pseudo-fund that
has no liquidity-timing skill (i.e., γp¼0 or, equivalently,
tγ¼0) by construction, that is, set the coefficient on the
liquidity-timing term to be zero.
rbp;tþ1 ¼ α^p þ β^pMKTtþ1 þ ∑
J
j ¼ 1
β^jf j;tþ1 þ ε^bp;tþ1 ð7Þ3. Estimate the liquidity-timing model Eq. (6) using
the pseudo-fund returns from Step 2, and store the
estimate of the timing coefficient and its t-statistic.
Because the pseudo-fund has a true γ of zero by
construction, any nonzero timing coefficient (and
t-statistic) comes from sampling variation.4. Complete Steps 1–3 across all the sample funds, so that
the cross-sectional statistics (e.g., the top 10th percentile)
of the estimates of the timing coefficients and their t-
statistics across all of the sample funds can be observed.5. Repeat Steps 1–4 for B iterations to generate the
empirical distributions for cross-sectional statistics
(e.g., the top 10th percentile) of t-statistics for the
pseudo-funds. In our analysis, we set the number of
bootstrap simulations B to 10,000. Finally, for a given
cross-sectional statistic, calculate its empirical p-value
as the frequency that the values of the bootstrapped
cross-sectional statistic (e.g., the top 10th percentile)
for the pseudo-funds from B simulations exceed the
actual value of the cross-sectional statistic.
The bootstrap analysis addresses the question: How
likely is it that a positive (or negative) test result for
liquidity-timing skill is the result of pure luck? For each
cross-sectional statistic of the timing coefficient (or its
t-statistic), we compare the actual estimate with the corre-
sponding distribution of estimates based on bootstrapped
pseudo-funds, and we determine whether the liquidity-
timing coefficient can be explained by random sampling
variation. We conduct our bootstrap analysis mainly for
t-statistics of the timing coefficient (i.e., tγ), because t-statistic
is a pivotal statistic and has favorable sampling properties in
bootstrap analysis (e.g., Horowitz, 2001).
Table 3 reports the empirical p-values corresponding to
the t-statistics of liquidity-timing coefficients at different
extreme percentiles from the bootstrap analysis. For all
extreme percentiles considered (from 1% to 10%), the
evidence suggests that the top liquidity-timing funds are
unlikely to be attributed to random chance. Specifically, for
the sample of 5,298 funds, the tγ^s for the top 1%, 3%, 5%,
and 10% liquidity-timing funds are 3.45, 2.72, 2.39, and
1.89, respectively, with empirical p-values all close to zero.
Table 3
Bootstrap analysis of liquidity timing.
This table presents the results of the bootstrap analysis of liquidity timing. For each fund with at least 36 monthly return observations, we estimate the
liquidity-timing model
rp;tþ1 ¼ αp þ βp;1MKTtþ1 þ γpMKTtþ1ðLm;tþ1−LmÞ þ βp;2SMBtþ1 þ βp;3YLDCHGtþ1 þ βp;4BAAMTSYtþ1
þβp;5PTFSBDtþ1 þ βp;6PTFSFXtþ1 þ βp;7PTFSCOMtþ1 þ εp;tþ1 ;
where rp,t+1 is the excess return on each individual fund in month t+1. The independent variables are the market excess return (MKT), a size factor (SMB),
monthly change in the ten-year Treasury constant maturity yield (YLDCHG), monthly change in the Moody's Baa yield less ten-year Treasury constant
maturity yield (BAAMTSY), and three trend-following factors: PFTSBD (bond), PFTSFX (currency), and PFTSCOM (commodity). Lm,t+1 is the market liquidity
measure in month t+1, and Lm is the mean level of market liquidity. The coefficient γ measures liquidity-timing ability. In the table, the first row reports the
sorted t-statistics of liquidity-timing coefficients across individual funds, and the second row is the empirical p-values from bootstrap simulations.
The number of resampling iterations is 10,000.
Bottom t-statistics for γ^ Top t-statistics for γ^
Category Number of funds 1% 3% 5% 10% 10% 5% 3% 1%
All funds 5,298 t-statistic −3.47 −2.60 −2.20 −1.60 1.89 2.39 2.72 3.45
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Hedge funds 3,078 t-statistic −3.50 −2.71 −2.30 −1.65 1.99 2.51 2.86 3.69
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Fund of funds 2,220 t-statistic −3.24 −2.49 −2.07 −1.56 1.70 2.25 2.52 3.11
p-value 0.09 0.12 0.49 0.68 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.19
Convertible arbitrage 142 t-statistic −4.27 −3.50 −3.17 −2.16 1.63 1.84 2.03 2.13
p-value 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.41 0.84 0.83 0.98
Emerging market 340 t-statistic −3.47 −2.95 −2.68 −2.15 1.80 2.23 2.48 2.68
p-value 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.17 0.28 0.88
Equity market neutral 239 t-statistic −4.27 −3.38 −2.74 −1.65 1.88 2.28 2.68 3.31
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.35 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.15
Event-driven 408 t-statistic −3.42 −2.71 −2.13 −1.38 2.18 2.73 3.00 3.92
p-value 0.04 0.01 0.27 0.96 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Global macro 177 t-statistic −3.05 −2.41 −1.78 −1.35 1.81 2.17 2.54 3.26
p-value 0.53 0.41 0.93 0.94 0.09 0.34 0.24 0.36
Long-short equity 1,465 t-statistic −3.32 −2.56 −2.10 −1.44 2.11 2.62 3.08 3.89
p-value 0.04 0.03 0.28 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Multi-strategy 307 t-statistic −3.04 −2.43 −2.25 −1.71 1.94 2.51 2.76 3.00
p-value 0.39 0.36 0.17 0.16 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.42
C. Cao et al. / Journal of Financial Economics 109 (2013) 493–516500The same result holds for both samples of hedge funds and
funds of funds (with only one exception for the top
1% fund).
We also conduct a bootstrap analysis for funds in each
strategy category. We find low empirical p-values for the
top-ranked t-statistics for the following strategies: long-
short equity, event-driven, multi-strategy, and equity
market neutral, supporting the notion that top-ranked
liquidity-timing coefficients are not due to random chance.
Meanwhile, the timing coefficients of top-ranked funds in
the convertible arbitrage, emerging market, and global
macro strategies cannot be distinguished from luck.
The negative timing coefficients of some funds cannot be
attributed to random chance. For example, the empirical p-
values associated with bottom-ranked tγ^s are all close to
zero for the samples of all funds, hedge funds, and funds in
three strategy categories.
Fig. 2 plots the kernel density distributions of boot-
strapped 10th percentile t-statistics in shaded areas, as
well as the actual t-statistics of the timing coefficients as a
vertical line for the sample of all funds, hedge funds, funds
of funds, and funds in each strategy category. These graphs
indicate that the distributions of bootstrapped t-statistics
are non-normal and, thus, the inference drawn from the
bootstrapped distributions and that from the conventional
significance levels under the normality assumption can be
different.For robustness, we implement additional bootstrap
procedures. In one experiment, we control for autocorrela-
tion in fund residuals from regression Eq. (6) when boot-
strapping pseudo fund returns. In another experiment,
we address the concern that fund residuals can
be correlated across funds (see Section 7.1 for details).
We also resample the factors and residuals jointly.
Although these procedures differ in resampling regression
residuals and factors, we find qualitatively similar results.
The evidence from the bootstrap analysis suggests that
top-ranked hedge fund managers can time market liquid-
ity, and the results for negative timing coefficients cannot
be attributed to randomness either. To further explore
whether liquidity timing truly reflects managerial skill,
we now examine the economic significance of liquidity
timing.4.3. Economic value of liquidity timing
Is liquidity-timing skill persistent over time? Can this
skill add economic value to investors? If so, the evidence
would lend additional support to the idea that liquidity
timing represents valuable managerial skill. To gauge the
practical significance of our liquidity-timing measure, we
investigate the investment value based on selecting top
liquidity timers.
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Fig. 2. T-statistics of the liquidity-timing coefficient for the top 10th percentile: actual fund verses bootstrapped funds. The shaded area represents the
density distribution of t-statistics of the liquidity-timing coefficient for 10,000 pseudo-funds that appear at the top 10th percentile in each of 10,000
bootstrap simulations for the cross-section of sample funds. The vertical line corresponds to the actual fund at the top 10th percentile for each fund
strategy category. The sample period is from January 1994 to December 2009.
C. Cao et al. / Journal of Financial Economics 109 (2013) 493–516 501In each month starting from January 1997, we estimate
the liquidity-timing coefficient for each fund using the
past 36-month estimation period and then form ten decile
portfolios based on their liquidity-timing coefficients.
These portfolios are held subsequently for a three-, six-,
nine-, or 12-month holding period, and the process is
repeated.9 This yields four distinct time series of returns,
one for each holding period, for each of the ten portfolios
of varying levels of liquidity-timing skill from 1997 to
2009. Whenever a fund disappears over the holding
period, its returns are included in calculating the portfolio
returns until its disappearance, and the portfolio is reba-
lanced going forward. Next we estimate the seven-factor
model and report each portfolio's alpha. Because this
investment strategy is most relevant to fund of funds
managers, we apply it to two samples: (1) all funds
including funds of funds and (2) hedge funds only.
Table 4 presents striking evidence on the economic
value of liquidity-timing ability. Specifically, the portfolio
consisting of the top 10% of liquidity timers delivers
economically significant alphas in the post-ranking9 We use the minimum three-month holding period because the
average lock-up period for our sample of hedge funds is about three
months.periods. As reported in the Fifth column, for a 12-month
holding period, the portfolio's alpha is 0.51% per month
(6.1% per year) with a t-statistic of 3.48 based on the
sample of all funds. Top liquidity-timing funds also gen-
erate significantly higher out-of-sample alphas than the
other funds. For instance, the spread in alpha between top
and bottom timing funds ranges from 0.33% to 0.46% per
month, depending on the holding periods, and remains
significant even one year after the ranking period. That is,
top liquidity-timing funds outperform bottom timing
funds by 4.0–5.5% per year subsequently on a risk-
adjusted basis. This result is both economically and statis-
tically significant.10 An analysis focusing on only hedge
funds produces the same result, that is, top liquidity-
timing funds realize an average alpha that is about three
times as large as the alphas of the other portfolios.
Although hedge funds with no liquidity-timing ability
can still generate alphas through other channels, top
liquidity timers stand out by delivering an annualized10 For robustness, we estimate alphas using the seven-factor model
augmented with two market return lags to adjust for potential serial
correlation in portfolio returns. In another robustness test, we estimate
seven-factor alphas after unsmoothing portfolio returns to remove serial
correlation. The inference about economic value of liquidity timing is
unchanged.
Table 4
Economic value of liquidity timing: evidence from out-of-sample alphas.
This table presents the out-of-sample alphas for the portfolios consisting of funds at different levels of liquidity-timing skill. In each month, we form ten
decile portfolios based on the funds' liquidity-timing coefficients estimated from the past 36 months (i.e., ranking period) and then hold these portfolios for
different periods of K months. The table reports the out-of-sample seven-factor alphas (in percent per month) estimated from the post-ranking returns.
T-statistics calculated based on Newey and West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors with two lags are reported in
parentheses.
All funds Hedge funds
Portfolio K¼3 6 9 12 K¼3 6 9 12
Portfolio 1 (top timers) 0.513 0.522 0.525 0.508 0.620 0.625 0.630 0.608
(2.96) (3.26) (3.46) (3.48) (3.34) (3.53) (3.75) (3.73)
Portfolio 2 0.323 0.322 0.310 0.297 0.348 0.354 0.342 0.337
(3.18) (3.32) (3.18) (3.05) (2.99) (3.38) (3.56) (3.50)
Portfolio 3 0.257 0.259 0.256 0.249 0.360 0.339 0.333 0.319
(3.26) (3.44) (3.27) (3.11) (4.36) (4.47) (4.02) (3.93)
Portfolio 4 0.228 0.239 0.232 0.222 0.302 0.312 0.301 0.292
(2.29) (2.96) (2.92) (2.65) (3.72) (4.41) (4.22) (3.95)
Portfolio 5 0.203 0.214 0.216 0.211 0.271 0.292 0.294 0.292
(2.62) (2.61) (2.63) (2.55) (4.07) (4.37) (4.35) (3.92)
Portfolio 6 0.195 0.197 0.202 0.198 0.240 0.240 0.247 0.249
(1.98) (1.96) (2.07) (2.09) (2.48) (2.52) (2.75) (2.88)
Portfolio 7 0.166 0.172 0.171 0.195 0.169 0.220 0.232 0.247
(1.68) (1.75) (1.71) (1.90) (1.94) (2.36) (2.51) (2.67)
Portfolio 8 0.171 0.182 0.197 0.209 0.308 0.294 0.295 0.307
(1.22) (1.48) (1.59) (1.67) (2.10) (2.20) (2.20) (2.32)
Portfolio 9 0.155 0.145 0.163 0.171 0.226 0.213 0.233 0.240
(1.34) (1.05) (1.26) (1.32) (2.10) (1.52) (1.57) (1.58)
Portfolio 10 (bottom timers) 0.180 0.102 0.070 0.081 0.255 0.192 0.162 0.176
(1.01) (0.54) (0.38) (0.46) (1.21) (0.89) (0.76) (0.83)
Spread (Portfolio 1–Portfolio 10) 0.333 0.420 0.455 0.427 0.365 0.433 0.468 0.432
(1.79) (2.33) (2.63) (2.51) (1.65) (2.01) (2.28) (2.13)
C. Cao et al. / Journal of Financial Economics 109 (2013) 493–516502alpha of 7.3%, which suggests that liquidity timing reflects
managerial skill and can be an important source of fund
alphas.
The economic value of liquidity-timing skill can be seen
more directly from Figs. 3 and 4. Fig. 3 plots out-of-sample
alphas for the portfolios of top versus bottom timing funds
for different holding periods. It illustrates that top
liquidity-timing funds have an average alpha two to four
times as large as that of bottom timing funds in post-
ranking periods. Fig. 4 plots cumulative returns on the
portfolios of top and bottom liquidity-timing funds,
respectively, for a 12-month holding period. Holding the
top-decile liquidity-timing funds yields a cumulative
return of 471% from January 1997 to December 2009,
and holding the bottom-decile liquidity timers generates
a cumulative return of only 296% over the same period.
Using portfolio returns from the post-ranking periods, we
further examine the persistence of liquidity-timing skill.
Specifically, after forming ten portfolios based on the past
liquidity-timing coefficients, we estimate the liquidity-timing
model Eq. (5) and evaluate fund managers' subsequent timing
ability. We find significant evidence of persistence in liquidity-
timing skill. For example, the portfolio consisting of the top
10% timing funds in the past 36 months generates an out-of-
sample timing coefficient of 0.56 (t-statistic¼2.22) for a 12-
month holding period. In contrast, the portfolio of bottom
timers in the past 36 months exhibits a subsequent timing
coefficient of 0.03 (t-statistic¼0.03) for the same holding
period. When we estimate Eq. (5) for the time series of thereturn spread between top and bottom timing funds, the
timing coefficient is 0.54 (t-statistic¼2.40) for a 12-month
holding period.
To summarize, we find strong evidence that liquidity-
timing skill adds economic value to investors, which
further confirms that liquidity timing reflects managerial
skill and can be one of the sources for hedge fund alpha.
We also show that this skill persists over time in out-of-
sample tests. This result is consistent with Jagannathan,
Malakhov, and Novikov (2010) who find significant persis-
tence in hedge fund alpha.
4.4. Liquidity timing versus liquidity reaction
The literature on timing ability examines whether fund
managers could forecast the level of market conditions.
If market conditions such as market liquidity are serially
correlated, their values in month t+1 contain information
from prior months. Thus, a fund manager may adjust
market exposure based on lagged values of market condi-
tions. As noted by Ferson and Schadt (1996), lagged market
conditions are public information and adjusting fund
betas based on public information does not reflect true
timing skill.
The Pástor-Stambaugh liquidity measure has mild serial
correlation. If a fund manager uses observed liquidity in
month t to derive a predictable component of liquidity and
adjusts his fund beta accordingly, he has no timing skill
but simply reacts to past liquidity conditions. This
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Fig. 3. Out-of-sample alphas for the portfolios of top verses bottom
timing funds. This figure plots out-of-sample alphas for the portfolios
consisting of top verses bottom timing funds for a holding period of
three, six, nine, or 12 months. In each month starting from January 1997,
we form the portfolios based on funds' liquidity-timing coefficients
estimated from the past 36 months. Panel A reports results for all funds
(including hedge funds and funds of funds), and Panel B reports results
for hedge funds only.
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Fig. 4. Cumulative returns of investing in top verses bottom timing hedge
funds. This figure plots cumulative returns of the portfolios consisting of
top versus bottom liquidity-timing hedge funds for a 12-month holding
period. In each month starting from January 1997, we form the portfolios
based on hedge funds' liquidity-timing coefficients estimated from the
past 36 months. These portfolios are held for 12 months subsequently.
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liquidity timing and liquidity reaction: Liquidity reactors
adjust fund betas based on observed market liquidity in
month t, and liquidity timers manage market exposure using
their forecasts of market liquidity in month t+1. To distin-
guish liquidity-timing skill from liquidity reaction, we esti-
mate the following model inwhich both liquidity-timing andliquidity-reaction terms are included:
rp;tþ1 ¼ αp þ βpMKTtþ1 þ γpMKTtþ1 ~Lm;tþ1
þφpMKTtþ1ðLm;t−LmÞ þ ∑
J
j ¼ 1
βjf j;tþ1 þ εp;tþ1: ð8Þ
In this regression, Lm,t is one-month lagged market
liquidity and represents a predictable component of
liquidity. ~Lm;tþ1 is the innovation in market liquidity from
an AR(2) process and the unpredictable component of
market liquidity. In Eq. (8), the coefficients γ and φ
measure liquidity-timing ability and liquidity reaction,
respectively. If a fund manager reacts only to past liquidity
conditions, we expect his timing coefficient to be insignif-
icant once we take liquidity reaction into account.
We find that liquidity-timing ability remains significant
after controlling for liquidity reaction simultaneously.
A bootstrap analysis based on regression Eq. (8) suggests
that tγ^s of top-ranked liquidity timers have empirical p-
values close to zero. In the bootstrap analysis, top-ranked
funds in the strategies of equity market neutral, event-
driven, long-short equity, and multi-strategy exhibit timing
ability. Overall, the inference about liquidity-timing ability
remains unchanged. In untabulated results, we also find
significant evidence of liquidity reaction among hedge funds.
To further explore the distinction between liquidity
reaction and liquidity timing, we examine the economic
value of the former using the same approach applied to
valuing the latter. We replace Lm,t+1 with Lm,t in Eq. (5),
repeat the analysis of economic value in Section 4.3, and
then obtain out-of-sample alphas of the ten liquidity-
reaction portfolios as well as the spread in alphas between
the top and bottom portfolios. The results in Table 5 show
that liquidity reaction does not generate economic value
for fund investors. For the sample of all funds, the out-of-
sample alpha for the portfolio consisting of top 10%
liquidity reactors is 0.24% for a 12-month holding period,
and the alpha for the bottom 10% liquidity reactors is 0.34%
for the same holding period. In fact, the spread between
the out-of-sample alphas of the top and bottom liquidity
reactors is small and insignificant for all the four holding
periods considered, i.e., three, six, nine, and 12 months.
Hence, funds' reaction to past market-liquidity conditions,
no matter whether it is fund managers' reaction to changes
in leverage or to fund flows (see more discussion in
Section 5), does not reflect managerial skill. Clearly, the
group of top liquidity timers is different from the group of
top liquidity reactors, and liquidity timing cannot be easily
replicated by reacting to past liquidity conditions.5. Alternative explanations
In this section, we examine the robustness of our results to
alternative explanations. We address the concern that hedge
funds' funding liquidity and redemption constraints could
affect the inference about liquidity timing. We also consider
the possibility that large funds' trades could impact market
liquidity. Finally, we examine liquidity timing by excluding the
2008–2009 financial crisis period.
Table 5
Economic value of liquidity reaction: evidence from out-of-sample alphas.
This table presents the out-of-sample alphas for the portfolios consisting of funds to various extents of reacting to past market liquidity conditions.
In each month, we form ten portfolios based on the funds' liquidity reaction coefficients estimated from the past 36 months (i.e., ranking period) and then
hold these portfolios for different periods of K months. The table reports the out-of-sample seven-factor alphas (in percent per month) estimated from the
post-ranking returns. T-statistics calculated based on Newey and West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors with two lags are
reported in parentheses.
All funds Hedge funds
Portfolio K¼3 6 9 12 K¼3 6 9 12
Portfolio 1 (top reactors) 0.116 0.116 0.174 0.242 0.251 0.255 0.311 0.363
(0.54) (0.56) (0.86) (1.29) (1.12) (1.19) (1.52) (1.88)
Portfolio 2 0.230 0.220 0.232 0.238 0.337 0.324 0.340 0.352
(1.55) (1.59) (1.66) (1.74) (1.98) (1.97) (2.22) (2.48)
Portfolio 3 0.239 0.226 0.228 0.229 0.324 0.295 0.300 0.303
(1.82) (1.92) (2.05) (2.06) (2.19) (2.62) (2.68) (2.85)
Portfolio 4 0.242 0.223 0.214 0.209 0.280 0.282 0.287 0.286
(2.68) (2.45) (2.41) (2.28) (3.35) (3.23) (3.43) (3.35)
Portfolio 5 0.189 0.207 0.212 0.208 0.325 0.344 0.348 0.320
(2.32) (2.51) (2.65) (2.52) (4.68) (4.64) (4.80) (4.18)
Portfolio 6 0.207 0.219 0.216 0.210 0.315 0.322 0.302 0.300
(2.36) (2.44) (2.42) (2.38) (3.39) (3.83) (3.58) (3.52)
Portfolio 7 0.214 0.218 0.214 0.216 0.289 0.298 0.300 0.306
(2.48) (2.54) (2.38) (2.30) (3.52) (3.36) (3.34) (3.28)
Portfolio 8 0.295 0.280 0.259 0.254 0.377 0.340 0.305 0.292
(3.01) (3.17) (2.88) (2.74) (4.24) (3.93) (3.42) (3.25)
Portfolio 9 0.278 0.293 0.269 0.252 0.286 0.330 0.307 0.288
(3.37) (3.22) (3.12) (2.91) (2.68) (3.33) (3.16) (2.87)
Portfolio 10 (bottom reactors) 0.422 0.388 0.366 0.339 0.446 0.380 0.355 0.335
(3.26) (2.95) (2.79) (2.56) (2.97) (2.44) (2.31) (2.21)
Spread (Portfolio 1–Portfolio 10) −0.306 −0.272 −0.192 −0.097 −0.195 −0.125 −0.044 0.028
(−1.42) (−1.33) (−0.97) (−0.50) (−0.75) (−0.45) (−0.06) (0.34)
11 The net leverage ratio is long and short exposure divided by the
assets under management, and the long-only leverage ratio is long
positions divided by the assets under management.
12 We examine the leverage-use indicator variable from TASS data
downloaded in different years from 1998 to 2010. According to the data,
most hedge funds do not change their leverage policy over time. On
average, less than 1% of funds change their status of leverage use from
one year to another.
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We are concerned about the possibility that our results
on liquidity timing might be driven by changes in hedge
fund leverage. As discussed in Lo (2008) and Ang, Gorovyy,
and van Inwegen (2011), hedge funds' use of leverage,
mainly provided by prime brokers through short-term
funding, exposes funds to the risk of sudden margin calls
that can force them to liquidate positions. Such forced
liquidations can occur to many funds at the same time,
especially during market liquidity shocks. Hence, one
might wonder if the reduction of market exposure in poor
market liquidity conditions merely reflects a deterioration
of funding liquidity because prime brokers have cut fund-
ing or increased borrowing costs. We consider this possi-
bility from four perspectives.
First, we have shown that liquidity-timing skill is
associated with subsequent superior performance. This
result should be more likely to be attributed to managerial
skill rather than to leverage. In fact, theory suggests that
funds experiencing fire sales should incur substantial
losses because forced liquidations are often associated
with distressed asset prices (e.g., Brunnermeier and
Pedersen, 2009).
Second, although leverage is sometimes portrayed as a
common characteristic of hedge funds, most hedge funds
use leverage to a much lesser extent than outsiders believe
especially after the LTCM debacle in 1998. Ang, Gorovyy,
and van Inwegen (2011) report an average net leverage
ratio of 0.58 and an average long-only leverage ratio of
1.36 when examining leverage ratios for 208 hedge fundsbased on data from a large fund of funds.11 They further
find that equity-oriented hedge funds, which are the focus
of our study, have lower leverage ratios compared with
non-equity-oriented funds. Hence, their finding suggests
that the effect of leverage change is not large for equity-
oriented hedge funds.
Third, to further address this concern about hedge fund
leverage, we repeat our analysis using a subsample of
funds that do not use leverage at all. If the changes in fund
beta are merely caused by fluctuations in leverage, hedge
funds that do not use leverage should exhibit no evidence
of liquidity-timing ability. Table 6 reports the results for
funds that do not use leverage. Among the 5,298 funds in
our sample, 2,649 of them claim not to use leverage while
the other 2,649 report the use of leverage.12 For the funds
that do not use leverage, the bootstrap results are con-
sistent with those in Table 3. The t γ^s for the top 1%, 3%, 5%,
and 10% liquidity-timing funds are 3.46, 2.76, 2.43, and
1.86, respectively, with empirical p-values all close to zero.
Furthermore, consistent with the evidence from the full
sample, we find evidence of liquidity timing among both
leverage users and non users for the following four
Table 6
Fund leverage and liquidity timing.
This table presents the results of the bootstrap analysis of liquidity timing for funds that use leverage and those that do not use leverage, separately. For
each fund with at least 36 monthly return observations, we estimate the liquidity-timing model
rp;tþ1 ¼ αp þ βp;1MKTtþ1 þ γpMKTtþ1ðLm;tþ1−LmÞ þ βp;2SMBtþ1 þ βp;3YLDCHGtþ1 þ βp;4BAAMTSYtþ1
þβp;5PTFSBDtþ1 þ βp;6PTFSFXtþ1 þ βp;7PTFSCOMtþ1 þ εp;tþ1;
where rp,t+1 is the excess return on each individual fund in month t+1. The independent variables include the market excess return (MKT), a size factor
(SMB), monthly change in the ten-year Treasury constant maturity yield (YLDCHG), monthly change in the Moody's Baa yield less ten-year Treasury
constant maturity yield (BAAMTSY), and three trend-following factors: PFTSBD (bond), PFTSFX (currency), and PFTSCOM (commodity). Lm,t+1 is the market
liquidity measure in month t+1, and Lm is the mean level of market liquidity. The coefficient γ measures liquidity-timing ability. In each panel, the first row
reports the sorted t-statistics of liquidity-timing coefficients across individual funds, and the second row is the empirical p-values from bootstrap
simulations. The number of resampling iterations is 10,000.
Bottom t-statistics for γ^ Top t-statistics for γ^
Category Number of funds 1% 3% 5% 10% 10% 5% 3% 1%
Panel A: Bootstrap results for funds that do not use leverage
All funds 2,649 t-statistic −3.47 −2.60 −2.22 −1.67 1.86 2.43 2.76 3.46
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Hedge funds 1,263 t-statistic −3.47 −2.69 −2.29 −1.71 2.05 2.59 3.00 3.89
p-value 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Fund of funds 1,386 t-statistic −3.52 −2.57 −2.18 −1.61 1.64 2.22 2.55 3.05
p-value 0.01 0.06 0.12 0.38 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.45
Panel B: Bootstrap results for funds that use leverage
All funds 2,649 t-statistic −3.50 −2.59 −2.18 −1.53 1.94 2.38 2.70 3.35
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Hedge funds 1,815 t-statistic −3.56 −2.71 −2.33 −1.59 1.98 2.46 2.79 3.33
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Fund of funds 834 t-statistic −3.02 −2.18 −1.96 −1.47 1.83 2.26 2.47 3.35
p-value 0.49 0.96 0.84 0.93 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.04
13 Unlike open-ended mutual funds that stand ready to redeem
capital for their investors, many hedge funds set redemption restrictions
through several provisions such as redemption frequency, lock-up peri-
ods, advance-notice periods, and redemption gates. Redemption
frequency sets the frequency of capital withdrawals. A lock-up period
refers to a time period during which initial investments cannot be
redeemed. After the lock-up period, many funds require their investors
to submit a notice prior to the actual redemption. Furthermore, a
redemption gate grants the fund manager the right to restrict redemp-
tions beyond a percentage of the fund's total assets.
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equity, and multi-strategy. Because funds that do not use
leverage still exhibit significant timing ability,
our evidence on liquidity-timing skill is unlikely to be
attributed to the impact of fund leverage.
Finally, we explicitly control for the impact of funding
constraints, measured by the TED spread, on our
liquidity-timing inference. The TED spread, measured
by the difference between the three-month LIBOR
(London Interbank Offered Rate) and the three-month
T-bill rate, indicates market-perceived counterparty
default risk. When the risk of counterparty default is
considered to be decreasing, the TED spread goes down
and a prime broker is inclined to provide greater
leverage. Hence, we include an additional interaction
term between the TED spread and market returns in the
liquidity-timing model Eq. (5):
rp;tþ1 ¼ αp þ βpMKTtþ1 þ γpMKTtþ1ðLm;tþ1−LmÞ
þλpMKTtþ1TEDtþ1 þ ∑
J
j ¼ 1
βjf j;tþ1 þ εp;tþ1: ð9Þ
In untabulated bootstrap analysis, we find significant
evidence of liquidity-timing ability even after controlling
for the impact of funding constraints. This result holds for
all sample funds, hedge funds, and funds of funds.
Taken together, these results suggest that externally
driven changes in hedge fund leverage are not driving our
findings about liquidity-timing skill among hedge funds.
By definition, liquidity timing reflects fund managers'
ability to forecast market liquidity and make ex ante
adjustment to market exposure. Although externalleverage changes can affect a fund’s market exposure, they
do not reflect managerial skill.
5.2. Investor redemptions
Besides broker-dictated changes in leverage, external
funding constraints can be caused by investor redemp-
tions, which present another mechanism by which a fund's
market exposure could change rapidly. As investors with-
draw their capital, fund managers have to unwind posi-
tions, leading to a decrease in market exposure (e.g.,
Khandani and Lo, 2007). During the recent financial crisis,
many hedge funds experienced heavy investor redemp-
tions and were forced to liquidate positions. We conduct
three tests to investigate this possibility.13
First, we repeat our analysis using funds that impose
a redemption frequency of one quarter or longer. A longer
redemption frequency blocks rapid capital redemptions,
and this provision is especially effective during market
crashes or liquidity crises. Thus, funds with low redemp-
tion frequency face relatively less pressure from investor
redemptions. Panel A of Table 7 contains bootstrap results
14 The AUM requirement of $150 million in the Dodd-Frank act
applies to fund advisers, and a fund adviser could manage multiple funds.
15 Ben-David, Franzoni, and Moussawi (2012) examine hedge funds'
trading patterns in stock markets during this financial crisis period.
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greater than one quarter. Out of all funds, 2,457 funds
(or 46% of the sample) meet this criterion, among which
1,488 are hedge funds and 969 are funds of funds.
The evidence is consistent with the results in Table 3.
For example, the tγ^s for the top 1%, 3%, 5%, and 10%
liquidity-timing funds are, respectively, 3.48, 2.79, 2.49,
and 2.01, with empirical p-values all below 1% for the
sample of all funds. Further analysis for hedge funds in
each strategy category yields results consistent with those
in Section 4. Intuitively, investor redemptions are more
likely to have an effect on funds with a higher redemption
frequency (e.g., a month). The fact that funds with lower
redemption frequency exhibit equally strong timing ability
as funds with higher redemption frequency suggests that
liquidity timing is mostly derived from managers' timing
ability, not from investors' informed redemption decisions.
Second, we examine liquidity-timing ability for funds
requiring a redemption notice period of 60 days; 1,340
funds, including 739 hedge funds and 601 funds of funds,
meet this requirement. The redemption notice period
allows more time for a fund manager to adjust positions
to meet investors' withdrawal requests, reducing the
market impact of redemptions. Panel B of Table 7 reports
these results. Once again, we find that our inference about
liquidity-timing skill remains unchanged, in that top-
ranked t-statistics of timing coefficients have p-values less
than or equal to 5% for the samples of all funds, hedge
funds, and funds of funds (with one exception).
Finally, we examine a subsample of funds having low
fund-flow volatility, and we report bootstrap results in
Panel C of Table 7. Specifically, we examine funds whose
monthly flow volatility is below the median level of peer
funds. Funds with low flow volatility should be less
affected by investor flows. Following prior research (e.g.,
Sirri and Tufano, 1998), we measure fund flows as the
percentage change in assets under management after
adjusting for fund returns. The subsample contains 2,533
funds (or 48% of the overall sample), which is not exactly
50% of the entire sample because some funds do not report
AUMs. Here, we find that the tγ^s for the top 1%, 3%, 5%, and
10% liquidity-timing funds are 3.43, 2.81, 2.44, and 1.95,
respectively, with empirical p-values all close to zero.
The same conclusion holds for the samples of 1,270 hedge
funds and 1,263 funds of funds that have low fund-flow
volatility. These findings are similar to the evidence
reported in Table 3, suggesting that fund flows cannot
explain our finding of liquidity-timing ability.
Collectively, we find significant evidence of liquidity
timing among funds that are subject to lower redemption
frequencies or longer redemption notice periods or have
lower fund-flow volatility. These findings indicate that our
evidence on liquidity timing is unlikely to be merely a
consequence of investor redemptions.
5.3. The impact of hedge fund trades on market liquidity
We now consider the possibility that our results are
driven by the impact of large funds' trading on market
liquidity. By definition, liquidity-timing ability implies a
positive relation between a fund's beta set by managers inmonth t and market liquidity observed in month t+1.
However, one could argue that hedge fund trading in
month t could affect market liquidity in month t+1. For
example, if large funds liquidate their equity positions
simultaneously in one month, market liquidity could
deteriorate in the next month, generating a positive link
between funds' market exposure and subsequent market
liquidity.
To address this concern, we examine liquidity-timing
ability using several subsamples of small funds, because
these funds' trades are unlikely to have an effect on market
liquidity. We employ subsamples of funds with AUM less
than $50 million (2,315 funds, collectively accounting for
about 9.2% of the total AUM of the sample funds) and less
than $150 million (3,984 funds, or 28.5% of the total AUM).
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protec-
tion Act of 2010 introduces significant regulation of hedge
funds, but the regulation applies only to fund advisers
with AUM of $150 million or more. Hence, we use $150
million as the threshold of materiality to distinguish small
funds from large ones.14 In addition, we perform a test in
which we define small funds as those having lower than
median R2 in a regression of fund returns on the portfolio
of the largest 10% of funds. The resulting subsample
contains 2,649 funds.
Table 8 reports the bootstrap results of liquidity timing
for different subsamples of small funds. Regardless of the
definition of small funds, we find evidence of liquidity
timing consistent with those reported previously. For
example, when small funds are defined as having AUM
less than $150 million, the tγ^s for the top 1%, 3%, 5%, and
10% liquidity-timing funds are 3.46, 2.69, 2.36, and 1.86,
respectively, and their p-values are close to zero. In sum,
among small funds that are unlikely to affect market
liquidity materially, we still find significant evidence for
liquidity-timing ability, which suggests that our results are
not driven by large-fund trading that could affect market
liquidity.5.4. Excluding the 2008–2009 crisis period
Most of the alternative explanations in Sections 5.1–5.3
should be especially relevant during market liquidity crises
because the impact of leverage, funding constraints, and
investor redemptions are the greatest during these peri-
ods. To focus squarely on these alternate explanations, we
examine liquidity-timing ability excluding the 2008–2009
financial crisis period.15 During the 1994–2007 period, we
find somewhat stronger evidence for liquidity-timing skill.
For example, 25.8% of the funds have t-statistics for the
timing coefficient exceeding 2.82, compared with 20.1%
reported in Table 2 for the entire sample period. A boot-
strap analysis indicates that top-ranked liquidity timers
have t-statistics corresponding to empirical values close to
zero. We obtain similar results for hedge funds and funds
Table 7
Investor redemptions, fund flows, and liquidity timing.
This table presents the results of the bootstrap analysis of liquidity timing for funds that have redemption frequency as quarterly or longer, that impose
redemption notice period equal or longer than 60 days, and that have fund-flow volatility lower than the median level. For each fund with at least 36
monthly return observations, we estimate the liquidity-timing model:
rp;tþ1 ¼ αp þ βp;1MKTtþ1 þ γpMKTtþ1ðLm;tþ1−LmÞ þ βp;2SMBtþ1 þ βp;3YLDCHGtþ1 þ βp;4BAAMTSYtþ1
þβp;5PTFSBDtþ1 þ βp;6PTFSFXtþ1 þ βp;7PTFSCOMtþ1 þ εp;tþ1 ;
where rp,t+1 is the excess return on each individual fund in month t+1. The independent variables include the market excess return (MKT), a size factor
(SMB), monthly change in the ten-year Treasury constant maturity yield (YLDCHG), monthly change in the Moody's Baa yield less ten-year Treasury
constant maturity yield (BAAMTSY), and three trend-following factors: PFTSBD (bond), PFTSFX (currency), and PFTSCOM (commodity). Lm,t+1 is the market
liquidity measure in month t+1, and Lm is the mean level of market liquidity. The coefficient γ measures liquidity-timing ability. In each panel, the first row
reports the sorted t-statistics of liquidity-timing coefficients across individual funds, and the second row is the empirical p-values from bootstrap
simulations. The number of resampling iterations is 10,000.
Bottom t-statistics for γ^ Top t-statistics for γ^
Category Number of funds 1% 3% 5% 10% 10% 5% 3% 1%
Panel A: Bootstrap results for funds that have redemption frequency equal or greater than a quarter
All funds 2,457 t-statistic −3.27 −2.57 −2.18 −1.59 2.01 2.49 2.79 3.48
p-value 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Hedge funds 1,488 t-statistic −3.27 −2.58 −2.20 −1.53 2.09 2.64 2.98 3.75
p-value 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.68 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Fund of funds 969 t-statistic −3.28 −2.56 −2.19 −1.63 1.72 2.31 2.49 2.98
p-value 0.16 0.09 0.14 0.27 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.60
Panel B: Bootstrap results for funds that have redemption notice period equal or longer than 60 days
All funds 1,340 t-statistic −3.34 −2.58 −2.18 −1.62 1.84 2.44 2.79 3.46
p-value 0.04 0.01 0.07 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Hedge funds 739 t-statistic −3.34 −2.76 −2.32 −1.75 1.89 2.59 2.92 3.76
p-value 0.10 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Fund of funds 601 t-statistic −2.82 −2.29 −1.99 −1.44 1.83 2.35 2.49 3.34
p-value 0.79 0.73 0.77 0.95 0.00 0.01 0.17 0.05
Panel C: Bootstrap results for funds that have fund-flow volatility lower than the median level
All funds 2,533 t-statistic −3.23 −2.51 −2.09 −1.55 1.95 2.44 2.81 3.43
p-value 0.05 0.02 0.19 0.62 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Hedge funds 1,270 t-statistic −3.05 −2.56 −2.18 −1.60 2.07 2.63 2.98 3.71
p-value 0.35 0.02 0.03 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Fund of funds 1,263 t-statistic −3.28 −2.46 −2.03 −1.50 1.81 2.25 2.60 3.21
p-value 0.09 0.23 0.62 0.89 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.08
16 Fung and Hsieh (2009) find that the date when a fund enters a
database can sometimes differ from the fund's inception date for reasons
unrelated to incubation period. For example, hedge funds could migrate
from one database to another, and one database sometimes can be
merged into another database. For robustness, we also experiment with
deleting the first 12 or 24 months for each fund, and we find that our
inference is unchanged.
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conserve space but are available upon request.
In summary, the analysis presented in this section
strongly suggests that our findings of the liquidity-timing
ability among hedge funds are not explained by mechan-
isms related to external changes in funding liquidity and
constraints. Although these effects do play an important
role in the hedge fund industry, they do not seem
materially related to liquidity timing.
6. The impact of hedge fund data biases
The pioneering works of Fung and Hsieh (1997, 2000)
show various biases in hedge fund data, including survi-
vorship bias, backfilling bias, and selection bias. We make
efforts to minimize the impact of these biases on our
results about the liquidity-timing ability. First, we follow
the convention of hedge fund literature to include both
live and defunct funds in this paper. The inclusion of
defunct funds alleviates the effect of survivorship bias, if
funds exit the database mainly due to poor performance.
Second, we examine the impact of backfill bias (or
incubation bias) that arises as a hedge fund could backfill
its historical performance when it is added into a database.
Fung and Hsieh (2000), using TASS data as of September1999, find a median backfill period of 343 days for hedge
funds. They further report a backfill bias of 1.4% per year in
average returns for hedge funds and 0.7% per year for
funds of funds. In our sample, the median backfill period is
23 months. To address the concern about backfill bias, we
discard the backfill period for each fund and use only fund
returns recorded after the date when the fund is added to
the TASS database.16 After we delete the backfill period,
the sample size reduces to 2,688 funds (1,815 hedge funds
and 873 funds of funds). The average monthly return for
hedge funds is 0.65% in this reduced sample compared
with 0.82% in the full sample (see Table 1), which indicates
a backfill bias about 2.0% per year. Meanwhile, the monthly
average return for funds of funds is 0.32% in the reduced
sample versus 0.34% in the full sample, implying a backfill
bias about 0.24% per year. Thus, the magnitude of backfill
Table 8
Liquidity timing of small funds.
This table presents the results of the bootstrap analysis of liquidity timing for funds that have assets under management (AUM) below $50 million, that
have AUM below $150 million, and that have lowerthanmedian R2 in a regression against returns of the portfolio of top 10% large funds. For each fund with
at least 36 monthly return observations, we estimate the liquidity-timing model
rp;tþ1 ¼ αp þ βp;1MKTtþ1 þ γpMKTtþ1ðLm;tþ1−LmÞ þ βp;2SMBtþ1 þ βp;3YLDCHGtþ1 þ βp;4BAAMTSYtþ1
þβp;5PTFSBDtþ1 þ βp;6PTFSFXtþ1 þ βp;7PTFSCOMtþ1 þ εp;tþ1 ;
where rp,t+1 is the excess return on each individual fund in month t+1. The independent variables include the market excess return (MKT), a size factor
(SMB), monthly change in the ten-year Treasury constant maturity yield (YLDCHG), monthly change in the Moody's Baa yield less ten-year Treasury
constant maturity yield (BAAMTSY), and three trend-following factors: PFTSBD (bond), PFTSFX (currency), and PFTSCOM (commodity). Lm,t+1 is the market
liquidity measure in month t+1, and Lm is the mean level of market liquidity. The coefficient γ measures liquidity-timing ability. In each panel, the first row
reports the sorted t-statistics of liquidity-timing coefficients across individual funds, and the second row is the empirical p-values from bootstrap
simulations. The number of resampling iterations is 10,000.
Bottom t-statistics for γ^ Top t-statistics for γ^
Category Number of funds 1% 3% 5% 10% 10% 5% 3% 1%
Panel A: Bootstrap results for funds with AUMo$50 million
All funds 2,315 t-statistic −3.38 −2.66 −2.23 −1.61 1.87 2.39 2.72 3.46
p-value 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Hedge funds 1,352 t-statistic −3.38 −2.71 −2.30 −1.62 1.91 2.48 2.82 3.69
p-value 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Fund of funds 963 t-statistic −3.49 −2.59 −2.21 −1.61 1.76 2.27 2.64 3.11
p-value 0.03 0.10 0.11 0.41 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.36
Panel B: Bootstrap results for funds with AUM o$150 million
All funds 3,984 t-statistic −3.51 −2.70 −2.26 −1.65 1.86 2.36 2.69 3.46
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Hedge funds 2,300 t-statistic −3.51 −2.75 −2.33 −1.69 1.94 2.48 2.79 3.49
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Fund of funds 1,684 t-statistic −3.53 −2.57 −2.18 −1.61 1.66 2.22 2.56 3.18
p-value 0.01 0.05 0.09 0.33 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.15
Panel C: Bootstrap results for funds that have lower than median R2 in a regression against returns of the portfolio of top 10% large funds
All funds 2,649 t-statistic −3.47 −2.63 −2.22 −1.55 2.08 2.55 2.88 3.69
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.69 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Hedge funds 2,151 t-statistic −3.51 −2.63 −2.22 −1.53 2.07 2.57 2.93 3.74
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.84 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Fund of funds 498 t-statistic −3.11 −2.71 −2.22 −1.76 2.12 2.44 2.81 3.35
p-value 0.49 0.02 0.10 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05
C. Cao et al. / Journal of Financial Economics 109 (2013) 493–516508bias for our sample is similar to that shown in Fung and
Hsieh (2000).
Table 9 presents the results of liquidity timing after we
control for backfill bias. Overall, the bootstrap analysis
delivers evidence consistent with the findings reported in
Section 4. For hedge funds, the t γ^ 's for the top 1%, 3%, 5%
and 10% liquidity-timing funds are respectively 4.09, 2.82,
2.43 and 1.91 and their empirical p-values are close to
zero. Note that though discarding the backfill period
mitigates the impact of backfill bias, it tilts the sample
towards funds with longer history. Because we require
each fund to have at least 36 monthly returns after their
backfill periods are discarded, most of the funds that
remain in the reduced sample have a track record longer
than five years. As a result, younger funds are excluded
from the analysis, which could bias against finding timing
skills if young funds tend to have better performance.
Another data bias is the selection bias, because reporting
to a database is voluntary in the hedge fund industry. It is
difficult to examine this bias because we do not observe
funds that choose not to report to any database. Fung and
Hsieh (1997, 2009) find anecdotal evidence indicating that
the selection bias could be limited, as some funds with
superior performance deliberately do not disclose their
information to data vendors. Recently, Agarwal, Fos, andJiang (forthcoming) use the mandatory 13F filing data to
study hedge fund selection bias and find no performance
difference between self-reporting funds and nonreporting
funds. One benefit for hedge funds to report to data vendors
is to attract potential investors because hedge funds are not
allowed to publicly advertise in the US. The upward bias
from self-reporting superior performance is offset by the
downward bias from hiding inferior performance because
some star hedge funds do not need to report to any data
vendor for more investors and poorly performed funds have
no incentive to report either. In addition, Fung and Hsieh
(2000) suggest that data of funds of funds contain less return
biases compared with hedge funds. For example, returns on
funds of funds are audited to match the performance of
underlying hedge funds, irrespective of whether an under-
lying fund is liquidated or stops reporting to the TASS
database. Further, when a new hedge fund is added to the
portfolio of a fund of funds, the tracking record of the fund of
funds does not change. Fung and Hsieh (2000) conclude that
using returns of funds of funds can help avoid biases in
hedge fund data. In this study, we find evidence of liquidity
timing for both hedge funds and funds of funds.
In summary, we evaluate the impact of biases in hedge
fund data, such as survivorship bias and backfill bias, on
the inference about the liquidity timing ability. Overall, our
Table 9
Evidence of liquidity timing with controls for backfill bias.
This table presents the results of liquidity timing with controls for backfill bias. To control for backfill bias, we exclude, for each fund, return observations
before the date when the fund was added to Lipper TASS. For each fund with at least 36 monthly return observations (after returns in the backfill period are
deleted), we estimate the liquidity-timing model
rp;tþ1 ¼ αp þ βp;1MKTtþ1 þ γpMKTtþ1ðLm;tþ1−LmÞ þ βp;2SMBtþ1 þ βp;3YLDCHGtþ1 þ βp;4BAAMTSYtþ1
þβp;5PTFSBDtþ1 þ βp;6PTFSFXtþ1 þ βp;7PTFSCOMtþ1 þ εp;tþ1 ;
where rp,t+1 is the excess return on each individual fund in month t+1. The independent variables are the market excess return (MKT), a size factor (SMB),
monthly change in the ten-yearTreasury constant maturity yield (YLDCHG), monthly change in the Moody's Baa yield less ten-year Treasury constant
maturity yield (BAAMTSY), and three trend-following factors: PFTSBD (bond), PFTSFX (currency), and PFTSCOM (commodity). Lm,t+1 is the market liquidity
measure in month t+1, and Lm is the mean level of market liquidity. The coefficient γ measures liquidity-timing ability. In the table, the first row reports the
sorted t-statistics of liquidity-timing coefficients across individual funds, and the second row is the empirical p-values from bootstrap simulations. In the
bootstrap test, the number of resampling iterations is 10,000.
Bottom t-statistics for γ^ Top t-statistics for γ^
Category Number of funds 1% 3% 5% 10% 10% 5% 3% 1%
All funds 2,688 t-statistic −3.46 −2.54 −2.16 −1.64 1.83 2.30 2.72 3.67
p-value 0.01 0.08 0.22 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Hedge funds 1,815 t-statistic −3.57 −2.64 −2.24 −1.70 1.91 2.43 2.82 4.09
p-value 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Fund of funds 873 t-statistic −2.75 −2.24 −2.00 −1.53 1.69 2.24 2.50 3.09
p-value 0.98 0.95 0.85 0.86 0.07 0.09 0.05 0.47
Convertible arbitrage 107 t-statistic −4.04 −3.58 −3.46 −2.62 1.17 1.93 1.99 2.13
p-value 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.98 0.82 0.89 0.97
Emerging market 177 t-statistic −4.12 −3.23 −2.39 −1.94 1.77 2.08 2.13 4.28
p-value 0.03 0.00 0.09 0.02 0.15 0.52 0.83 0.01
Equity market neutral 155 t-statistic −4.23 −3.46 −2.71 −2.07 1.80 2.18 2.68 4.44
p-value 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.09 0.07 0.02 0.00
Event-driven 277 t-statistic −3.31 −2.43 −2.09 −1.44 2.08 2.43 2.65 3.60
p-value 0.31 0.44 0.53 0.90 0.00 0.04 0.05 0.10
Global macro 100 t-statistic −4.54 −2.30 −2.03 −1.64 1.84 2.64 2.73 4.09
p-value 0.11 0.73 0.66 0.52 0.18 0.07 0.27 0.15
Long-short equity 897 t-statistic −3.19 −2.43 −2.06 −1.45 2.08 2.67 3.10 4.38
p-value 0.48 0.59 0.72 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Multi-strategy 102 t-statistic −2.65 −2.59 −2.38 −1.83 1.93 2.42 2.33 3.63
p-value 0.58 0.18 0.19 0.17 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.05
C. Cao et al. / Journal of Financial Economics 109 (2013) 493–516 509results about liquidity timing are not driven by these data
biases.
7. Alternative bootstrap procedures, timing model
speciﬁcations, risk factors, and liquidity measures
In this section, we present several robustness checks
for our empirical findings, using bootstrap procedures
accounting for time series and cross-correlations correla-
tions in regression residuals; alternative timing-model
specifications, including a liquidity-timing model that
controls for market and volatility timing and another
liquidity timing model that controls for systematic stale
pricing; alternative factors in the benchmark model; and
an alternative measure of market-wide liquidity.
7.1. Bootstrap analysis accounting for time series and cross-
sectional correlations in residuals
The bootstrap procedure described in Section 4.2
assumes that the residuals from the liquidity-timing
regressions are independently and identically distributed
for the funds. Here, we consider the cases in which the
residuals can have serial dependence over time or cross-
sectional correlation across funds, and we evaluate their
effect on the bootstrap results for liquidity-timing skill.First, we employ a parametric approach, the sieve
bootstrap (e.g., Bühlmann, 1997), to control for potential
serial correlations in residuals in the bootstrap analysis.
Suppose that residuals follow an unknown stationary
process. In the sieve bootstrap, we approximate this
process using a p-order autoregressive process, i.e.,
AR (p), with the order p chosen by the Akaike information
criterion (AIC) for each fund. The coefficients of the
autoregression are estimated for each fund. Then, instead
of resampling residuals directly, we first resample the
error terms from the autoregression and then generate
bootstrap residuals by plugging the resampled error terms
back into the AR model. Panel A of Table 10 reports the
results from the sieve bootstrap, which suggests the
existence of liquidity timing skill among the sample funds.
Second, we use a nonparametric block bootstrap
approach (e.g., Hall, Horowitz, and Jing, 1995), to control
for potential serial dependence in residuals. Specifically,
we resample residual blocks that can be overlapping to
preserve serial correlation in the bootstrap analysis. Hall,
Horowitz, and Jing (1995) show that the optimal block size
is n1/4 for estimating a one-sided distribution function,
where n is the length of the fund return time series.
We follow their procedure to perform a block bootstrap
analysis, and the results suggest that top-ranked timers
cannot be attributed to pure randomness. For robustness,
Table 10
Bootstrap analysis with controls for time series and cross-sectional correlations in regression residuals.
This table presents the bootstrap results with controls for time series and cross-sectional correlations in regression residuals. For each fund with at least
36 monthly return observations, we estimate the liquidity-timing model
rp;tþ1 ¼ αp þ βp;1MKTtþ1 þ γpMKTtþ1ðLm;tþ1−LmÞ þ βp;2SMBtþ1 þ βp;3YLDCHGtþ1 þ βp;4BAAMTSYtþ1
þβp;5PTFSBDtþ1 þ βp;6PTFSFXtþ1 þ βp;7PTFSCOMtþ1 þ εp;tþ1 ;
where rp,t+1 is the excess return on each individual fund in month t+1. The independent variables include the market excess return (MKT), a size factor
(SMB), monthly change in the ten-year Treasury constant maturity yield (YLDCHG), monthly change in the Moody's Baa yield less ten-year Treasury
constant maturity yield (BAAMTSY), and three trend-following factors: PFTSBD (bond), PFTSFX (currency), and PFTSCOM (commodity). Lm,t+1 is the market
liquidity measure in month t+1, and Lm is the mean level of market liquidity. The coefficient γ measures liquidity-timing ability. In Panel A, we control for
time series correlation in residuals by imposing an AR(p) process on the regression residuals of each fund, with the order p chosen by the Akaike
information criterion (AIC). Instead of resampling the residuals, we first resample the error terms from the AR process and then generate bootstrap
residuals using the AR process. In Panel B, we control for cross-sectional correlation in residuals by resampling fund returns in the same month all together.
In the table, the first row reports the sorted t-value of liquidity-timing coefficients across individual funds, and the second row is the empirical p-values
from bootstrap simulations. The number of resampling iterations is 10,000.
Bottom t-statistics for γ^ Top t-statistics for γ^
Category Number of funds 1% 3% 5% 10% 10% 5% 3% 1%
Panel A: Bootstrap results with controls for time-series correlation in residuals
All funds 5,298 t-statistic −3.47 −2.60 −2.20 −1.60 1.89 2.39 2.72 3.45
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Hedge funds 3,078 t-statistic −3.50 −2.71 −2.30 −1.65 1.99 2.51 2.86 3.69
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Fund of funds 2,220 t-statistic −3.24 −2.49 −2.07 −1.56 1.70 2.25 2.52 3.11
p-value 0.11 0.16 0.57 0.72 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.25
Convertible arbitrage 142 t-statistic −4.27 −3.50 −3.17 −2.16 1.63 1.84 2.03 2.13
p-value 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.85 0.85 0.99
Emerging market 340 t-statistic −3.47 −2.95 −2.68 −2.15 1.80 2.23 2.48 2.68
p-value 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.18 0.30 0.89
Equity market neutral 239 t-statistic −4.27 −3.38 −2.74 −1.65 1.88 2.28 2.68 3.31
p-value 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.37 0.03 0.07 0.09 0.22
Event-driven 408 t-statistic −3.42 −2.71 −2.13 −1.38 2.18 2.73 3.00 3.92
p-value 0.04 0.02 0.28 0.96 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Global macro 177 t-statistic −3.05 −2.41 −1.78 −1.35 1.81 2.17 2.54 3.26
p-value 0.55 0.44 0.93 0.93 0.10 0.35 0.25 0.37
Long-short equity 1465 t-statistic −3.32 −2.56 −2.10 −1.44 2.11 2.62 3.08 3.89
p-value 0.05 0.04 0.32 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Multi-strategy 307 t-statistic −3.04 −2.43 −2.25 −1.71 1.94 2.51 2.76 3.00
p-value 0.43 0.41 0.21 0.18 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.46
Panel B: Bootstrap results with controls for cross-sectional correlation in residuals
All funds 5,298 t-statistic −3.47 −2.60 −2.20 −1.60 1.89 2.39 2.72 3.45
p-value 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03
Hedge funds 3,078 t-statistic −3.50 −2.71 −2.30 −1.65 1.99 2.51 2.86 3.69
p-value 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Fund of funds 2,220 t-statistic −3.24 −2.49 −2.07 −1.56 1.70 2.25 2.52 3.11
p-value 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.09
Convertible arbitrage 142 t-statistic −4.27 −3.50 −3.17 −2.16 1.63 1.84 2.03 2.13
p-value 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.11 0.24 0.26 0.55
Emerging market 340 t-statistic −3.47 −2.95 −2.68 −2.15 1.80 2.23 2.48 2.68
p-value 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.20
Equity market neutral 239 t-statistic −4.27 −3.38 −2.74 −1.65 1.88 2.28 2.68 3.31
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.04
Event-driven 408 t-statistic −3.42 −2.71 −2.13 −1.38 2.18 2.73 3.00 3.92
p-value 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
Global macro 177 t-statistic −3.05 −2.41 −1.78 −1.35 1.81 2.17 2.54 3.26
p-value 0.12 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.07
Long-short equity 1,465 t-statistic −3.32 −2.56 −2.10 −1.44 2.11 2.62 3.08 3.89
p-value 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Multi-strategy 307 t-statistic −3.04 −2.43 −2.25 −1.71 1.94 2.51 2.76 3.00
p-value 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.07
C. Cao et al. / Journal of Financial Economics 109 (2013) 493–516510we also experiment with block size of n1/3 and n1/5, and
the inference about liquidity timing is unchanged. The
details of the results are not tabulated to conserve space.
Finally, to address possible cross-sectional correlation
in the residuals, we follow Kosowski, Timmermann, White,and Wermers (2006) to resample residuals of the same
month together for all funds. This way, we preserve cross-
sectional correlation in the residuals. However, this pro-
cedure has a drawback. As not all funds have observations
over the entire sample period, it is likely that some funds
Table 11
Controlling for market return timing and volatility timing.
This table presents the bootstrap results of liquidity timing with controls for market return timing and volatility timing. For each fund with at least 36 monthly return observations, we estimate the liquidity-
timing model:
rp;tþ1 ¼ αp þ βp;1MKTtþ1 þ γpMKTtþ1ðLm;tþ1−LmÞ þ λpMKT2tþ1 þ δpMKTtþ1ðVoltþ1−VolÞ þ βp;2SMBtþ1 þ βp;3YLDCHGtþ1
þβp;4BAAMTSYtþ1 þ βp;5PTFSBDtþ1 þ βp;6PTFSFXtþ1 þ βp;7PTFSCOMtþ1 þ εp;tþ1 ;
where rp,t+1 is the excess return on each individual fund in month t+1. The independent variables are the market excess return (MKT), a size factor (SMB), monthly change in the ten-year Treasury constant maturity
yield (YLDCHG), monthly change in the Moody's Baa yield less ten-year Treasury constant maturity yield (BAAMTSY), and three trend-following factors: PFTSBD (bond), PFTSFX (currency), and PFTSCOM
(commodity). Lm,t+1 is the market liquidity measure in month t+1, and Lm is the mean level of market liquidity. Vol is the market volatility measured by the Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility Index
(VIX). The coefficients γ, λ, and δmeasure liquiditytiming, market timing, and volatility timing, respectively. Panel A reports the evidence on liquidity timing. For comparison, Panel B reports the evidence on market
timing. In the table, the first row reports the sorted t-value of liquidity-timing coefficients across individual funds, and the second row is the empirical p-values from bootstrap simulations. The number of
resampling iterations is 10,000.
Panel A: Evidence on liquidity timing
Bottom t-statistics for γ^ Top t-statistics for γ^
Category Number of funds 1% 3% 5% 10% 10% 5% 3% 1%
All funds 5,298 t-statistic −3.26 −2.42 −2.11 −1.41 2.04 2.50 2.81 3.65
p-value 0.13 0.78 0.69 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Hedge funds 3,078 t-statistic −3.53 −2.59 −2.23 −1.61 2.00 2.54 2.93 3.77
p-value 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.59 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Fund of funds 2,220 t-statistic −2.76 −2.21 −1.81 −1.14 2.07 2.42 2.67 3.26
p-value 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.27
Convertible arbitrage 142 t-statistic −7.13 −3.28 −3.11 −2.60 1.26 1.50 1.83 2.19
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.99
Emerging market 340 t-statistic −3.37 −2.67 −2.43 −1.96 1.78 2.12 2.49 3.27
p-value 0.22 0.10 0.03 0.00 0.13 0.55 0.39 0.32
Equity market neutral 239 t-statistic −4.31 −3.46 −2.66 −1.98 2.07 2.54 2.82 3.32
p-value 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.30
Event-driven 408 t-statistic −2.79 −2.15 −1.86 −0.93 2.52 2.98 3.25 3.84
p-value 0.80 0.92 0.96 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Global macro 177 t-statistic −2.95 −2.32 −2.23 −1.38 1.76 2.00 2.21 2.81
p-value 0.71 0.64 0.34 0.95 0.21 0.73 0.82 0.80
Long-short equity 1,465 t-statistic −3.50 −2.51 −2.14 −1.51 2.07 2.54 3.00 4.34
p-value 0.02 0.31 0.43 0.96 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Multi-strategy 307 t-statistic −2.73 −2.24 −2.05 −1.69 1.91 2.55 2.93 3.59
p-value 0.88 0.84 0.75 0.35 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.08
Panel B: Evidence on marketreturn timing
Bottom t-statistics for λ^ Top t-statistics forλ^
Category Number of funds 1% 3% 5% 10% 10% 5% 3% 1%
All funds 5,298 t-statistic −4.96 −3.96 −3.45 −2.79 1.30 1.96 2.44 3.50
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.83 0.00
Hedge funds 3,078 t-statistic −4.64 −3.45 −3.08 −2.44 1.69 2.33 2.75 3.93
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00
Fund of funds 2,220 t-statistic −5.16 −4.23 −3.84 −3.15 0.48 0.91 1.30 2.16
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Convertible arbitrage 142 t-statistic −4.28 −1.85 −1.72 −1.34 2.67 3.63 3.75 4.11
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C. Cao et al. / Journal of Financial Economics 109 (2013) 493–516512have resampled residuals from months when they do not
have a return observation (e.g., before they started operat-
ing or after they became defunct) and, thus, the resampled
residuals for these months are set as missing values. To run
meaningful regressions, we require each fund to have at
least 36 non-missing resampled observations and, accord-
ingly, the number of bootstrap funds in each simulation is
smaller than the number of actual funds. As reported in
Panel B of Table 10, the results from this procedure still
suggest existence of liquidity-timing skill.
7.2. Controlling for market and volatility timing
Our liquidity-timing model (5) focuses on the adjust-
ment of fund beta in response to market liquidity.
However, fund managers could time market returns and
volatility as well. Because market liquidity is positively
correlated with market returns and negatively correlated
with market volatility, the evidence on liquidity timing
could partially reflect fund managers' market- or volatility-
timing ability. To address this concern, we explicitly
control for market timing and volatility timing in our
liquidity-timing model in the specification
rp;tþ1 ¼ αp þ βpMKTtþ1 þ γpMKTtþ1ðLm;tþ1−LmÞ þ λpMKT2tþ1
þδpMKTtþ1ðVoltþ1−VolÞ þ ∑
J
j ¼ 1
βjf j;tþ1 þ εp;tþ1; ð10Þ
where Volt+1 is the market volatility in month t+1 as
measured by the CBOE S&P 500 index option implied
volatility (i.e., the VIX) and Vol is the time series mean of
market volatility. The correlation between market returns and
the Pástor-Stambaugh liquidity measure is 0.23 over the
sample period 1994–2009, and the correlation between the
VIX and the liquidity measure is −0.33 over the same period.
The coefficients γ, λ, and δ measure liquidity-timing, market-
timing, and volatility-timing ability, respectively.
In Panel A of Table 11, we present empirical p-values
associated with t-statistics of liquidity-timing coefficients
at different tail percentiles from the bootstrap analysis.
With controls for market and volatility timing, we still
observe significant evidence of liquidity-timing skill. For
the overall sample, tγ^s for the top 1%, 3%, 5%, and 10%
liquidity-timing funds are 3.65, 2.81, 2.50, and 2.04,
respectively, and their empirical p-values are all close to
zero. This result holds for hedge funds and funds of funds
as well. Among seven strategy categories, most top-ranked
funds in the categories of equity market neutral, event-
driven, long-short equity and multi-strategies have
empirical p-values less than 5%. Interestingly, after we
control for market and volatility timing, the evidence of
negative liquidity timing becomes much weaker.
For comparison, Panel B of Table 10 provides bootstrap
results for t-statistics of market-timing coefficients. For
individual hedge funds, strong evidence exists of positive
market-timing ability as well as negative timing. The cutoff
t-statistics at extreme percentiles and the associated
empirical p-values are similar to those for liquidity timing.
No evidence exists of successful market timing for funds of
funds. Funds of funds are essentially indices of hedge
funds and, thus, represent a mixture of real timers and
C. Cao et al. / Journal of Financial Economics 109 (2013) 493–516 513other funds, which could explain why the results for funds
of funds differ from those for individual hedge funds.17
7.3. Controlling for systematic stale pricing
Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004) show that hedge fund
returns often exhibit significant serial correlation. One reason
for this result is that hedge funds hold relatively illiquid assets
that do not trade frequently. This thin or nonsynchronous
trading can bias estimates of fund beta (e.g., Scholes and
Williams, 1977; and Dimson, 1979). Chen, Ferson, and Peters
(2010) show that if the extent of stale pricing is related to the
market factor (a case they call systematic stale pricing), then
the inference about timing ability can also be biased. They
address this problemwhen measuring timing ability for bond
mutual funds, and they find that controlling for this bias is
important. In the same spirit of Chen, Ferson, and Peters
(2010), we reexamine liquidity-timing skill using a model
including two lagged market excess returns and two interac-
tion terms between lagged market returns and market
liquidity measures:
rp;tþ1 ¼ αp þ βp;1MKTtþ1 þ βp;2MKTt þ βp;3MKTt−1
þγp;1MKTtþ1ðLm;tþ1−LmÞ þ γp;2MKTtðLm;t−LmÞ
þγp;3MKTt−1ðLm;t−1−LmÞ þ ∑
J
j ¼ 1
βjf j;tþ1 þ εp;tþ1: ð11Þ
The results show that MKTt and MKTt−1 in general enter
the regression significantly for most of the sample funds,
indicating illiquid holdings in hedge fund portfolios. However,
we still observe significant evidence of liquidity timing for the
groups of all funds, hedge funds, funds of funds, equity market
neutral, event driven, long-short equity, and multi-strategy
funds. We omit the details of these results to conserve space,
but they are available upon request.
7.4. Alternative factors
Fung and Hsieh (1997, 2001) find evidence that some
hedge fund strategies can generate option-like returns.
Jagannathan and Korajczyk (1986) show that if funds invest
in options and stocks with option-like payoffs, artificial
market-timing evidence can arise for these funds that have
no real timing skill. Similarly, spurious liquidity timing could
exist if hedge funds hold some assets (including options)
whose market exposure varies with market liquidity condi-
tions. Although it is a priori unclear what types of assets have
such dynamic market exposure, we conduct a few experi-
ments to address this concern about model misspecification.
We consider an alternative factor model that includes
the market factor, a size factor, a value factor, a momentum
factor, and two of the Agarwal and Naik (2004) option17 See, e.g., Chen (2007) and Chen and Liang (2007) for additional
discussion about market-timing ability in hedge funds. In the paper, we
also examine liquidity-timing ability using a conditional timing model.
Following Ferson and Schadt (1996), we proxy for public information by
one-month lagged values of the three-month T-bill rate, the term
premium between the ten-year and three-month Treasury yields, the
credit premium between Moody's BAA- and AAA-rated corporate bonds
yields, and the dividend yield of the S&P 500 index. With the conditional
timing model, the inference about liquidity-timing skill is unchanged.factors constructed from out-of-the-money options on the
S&P 500 index.18 That is, we use these alternative factors in
regression Eq. (5) to reexamine liquidity-timing skill. After
including option factors in the benchmark model, we find
that the bootstrap results are consistent with the evidence
presented in Section 4. For the samples of all funds, hedge
funds, and funds of funds, top-ranked t-statistics of the
timing coefficients have empirical p-values below the
conventional significance level.19 Collectively, the findings
do not suggest that our liquidity-timing model is
misspecified.7.5. Alternative liquidity measures
Liquidity is a complex and multi-faceted concept that
can be measured in different ways. The Pástor-Stambaugh
measure focuses on market-wide liquidity related to
temporary price impact. Because it captures well-known
episodes of low market liquidity, the measure is particu-
larly appealing to our study of liquidity-timing ability.
As an alternative measure, the Amihud (2002) illiquidity
measure is based on the ratio of absolute return to trading
volume and captures the average price impact of $1
million trade in 1962 stock market dollars distributed
equally across stocks. We repeat our fund-level analyses
of liquidity-timing skill using the Amihud measure of
market illiquidity. For convenience, we multiply the
Amihud illiquidity measure by −1 so that the timing
coefficient based on this measure has the same interpreta-
tion as that from the Pástor-Stambaugh liquidity measure.
As shown in Table 12, the bootstrap results based on
the Amihud measure are consistent with those based on
the Pástor-Stambaugh measure in Table 3. Take the sample
of all funds as an example. The tγ^s for the top 1%, 3%, 5%,
and 10% liquidity-timing funds are 4.98, 3.64, 3.00, and
2.29, respectively, and their empirical p-values are close to
zero. The bootstrap analysis suggests that the evidence for
top-ranked liquidity-timing funds cannot be attributed to
pure luck for the samples of all funds, hedge funds, and
funds of funds or funds in equity market neutral, event-
driven, global macro, long-short equity, and multi-strategy
categories. Overall, we find consistent results when using
the Amihud measure.
We recognize that there are other proxies for liquidity.
The Pástor-Stambaugh and Amihud measures, designed to
capture the price-impact dimension of liquidity, are esti-
mated using daily stock returns and volumes. The estima-
tion of other measures such as effective bid-ask spread
often requires intraday trade-and-quote data and is com-
putationally intensive. For example, Goyenko, Holden, and
Trzcinka (2009) compute spread-based and price impact—
based liquidity measures using intraday data of only 400
stocks due to computational limit. In this paper, we do not18 We thank Vikas Agarwal for providing us with the data for the
option-return factors.
19 To further check the robustness of our results to the choice of
benchmark models, we augment the liquidity-timing model Eq. (5) with
a liquidity risk factor proxied by monthly innovations in the Pástor-
Stambaugh liquidity measure from an AR(2) process. The results are
consistent with those reported in Table 3.
Table 12
Liquidity timing using the Amihud liquidity measure.
This table presents the results of the bootstrap analysis of liquidity timing using the Amihud (2002) market liquidity measure. For each fund with at least
36 monthly return observations, we estimate the liquidity-timing model
rp;tþ1 ¼ αp þ βp;1MKTtþ1 þ γpMKTtþ1ðLm;tþ1−LmÞ þ βp;2SMBtþ1 þ βp;3YLDCHGtþ1 þ βp;4BAAMTSYtþ1
þβp;5PTFSBDtþ1 þ βp;6PTFSFXtþ1 þ βp;7PTFSCOMtþ1 þ εp;tþ1 ;
where rp,t+1 is the excess return on each individual fund in month t+1. The independent variables are the market excess return (MKT), a size factor (SMB),
monthly change in the ten-year Treasury constant maturity yield (YLDCHG), monthly change in the Moody's Baa yield less ten-year Treasury constant
maturity yield (BAAMTSY), and three trend-following factors: PFTSBD (bond), PFTSFX (currency), and PFTSCOM (commodity). Lm,t+1 is the Amihud market
liquidity measure (multiplied by −1) in month t+1, and Lm is the mean level of market liquidity. We multiply the Amihud illiquidity measure by −1 so that
the liquidity-timing coefficient has the same interpretation as that based on the Pástor-Stambaugh liquidity measure. The coefficient γ measures liquidity-
timing ability. In the table, the first row reports the sorted t-value of liquidity-timing coefficients across individual funds, and the second row is the
empirical p-values from bootstrap simulations. The number of resampling iterations is 10,000.
Bottom t-statistics for γ^ Top t-statistics for γ^
Category Number of funds 1% 3% 5% 10% 10% 5% 3% 1%
All funds 5,298 t-statistic −3.84 −3.12 −2.68 −2.01 2.29 3.00 3.64 4.98
p-value 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Hedge funds 3,078 t-statistic −4.02 −3.40 −2.86 −2.23 2.07 2.75 3.29 4.79
p-value 0.11 0.00 0.02 0.62 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Fund of funds 2,220 t-statistic −3.44 −2.75 −2.24 −1.63 2.60 3.31 3.92 5.09
p-value 0.08 0.00 0.11 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Convertible arbitrage 142 t-statistic −4.74 −4.42 −3.96 −2.13 1.41 1.96 2.14 3.15
p-value 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.11 0.49 0.33 0.37 0.18
Emerging market 340 t-statistic −4.93 −4.01 −3.71 −2.60 1.52 2.19 2.51 3.63
p-value 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.51 0.23 0.41 0.27
Equity market neutral 239 t-statistic −3.62 −3.24 −2.70 −1.96 2.19 2.79 3.31 4.02
p-value 0.18 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05
Event-driven 408 t-statistic −3.52 −2.35 −1.92 −1.47 2.60 3.27 3.80 4.21
p-value 0.06 0.46 0.82 0.79 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Global macro 177 t-statistic −4.09 −2.93 −2.72 −1.57 2.87 3.55 3.82 4.85
p-value 0.13 0.22 0.05 0.82 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.11
Long-short equity 1,465 t-statistic −3.08 −2.38 −1.92 −1.37 2.71 3.31 3.85 4.90
p-value 0.47 0.55 0.97 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Multi-strategy 307 t-statistic −3.91 −2.75 −2.61 −1.81 2.38 3.05 3.82 4.43
p-value 0.06 0.09 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
20 Recently, Cao, Simin, and Wang (2013) study the liquidity-timing
ability of mutual fund managers.
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study liquidity timing, and we leave this subject for future
research.
8. Conclusions
In this paper, we explore a new dimension of fund
managers' timing ability—their ability to time market
liquidity—and examine whether hedge fund managers
possess liquidity timing ability by adjusting their portfo-
lios' market exposure as aggregate market liquidity condi-
tions change. We focus on hedge funds because they are
among the most dynamic investment vehicles and their
performance is strongly affected by market liquidity
conditions. Using a large sample of 5,298 equity-oriented
hedge funds (including funds of funds) from 1994 to 2009,
we evaluate liquidity-timing ability at the individual fund
level and find strong evidence of liquidity timing among
the funds.
In particular, hedge fund managers increase (decrease)
their market exposure when equity market liquidity is
high (low), and this effect is both economically and
statistically significant. Our bootstrap analysis suggests
that top-ranked liquidity timers cannot be attributed to
sampling variation. In addition, liquidity-timing skillpersists over time and adds value to fund investors.
In particular, top liquidity-timing funds subsequently out-
perform bottom liquidity-timing funds by 4.0%–5.5% per
year on a risk-adjusted basis. This result suggests that
liquidity timing represents managerial skill and can be one
important source of hedge fund alphas. We also distin-
guish liquidity-timing skills from liquidity reaction that
primarily relies on public information, and we show that
the latter does not generate investment value.
Finally, we conduct a wide array of sensitivity tests and
show that our inference about liquidity timing holds in all
these tests. Our findings are robust to alternative explana-
tions related to funding liquidity and investor redemp-
tions, alternative timing model specifications, risk factors,
and liquidity measures. Our results are also robust to
hedge fund data biases, such as survivorship bias and
backfill bias. To conclude, our examination of fund man-
agers' liquidity-timing ability highlights the importance of
understanding and incorporating market liquidity condi-
tions in asset management and investment decision
making.20
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(2002) liquidity measures
The Pástor-Stambaugh (2003) liquidity measure cap-
tures market liquidity associated with temporary price
fluctuations induced by order flows, which can be inter-
preted as volume-related price reversals attributable to
liquidity effects.
For each stock i listed on the NYSE and Amex in each
month t, its liquidity ηi,t is measured by the regression
ri;dþ1;t ¼ θi;t þ ϕi;tri;d;t þ ηi;tsignðri;d;tÞnvi;d;t
þεi;dþ1;t ; d¼ 1; …; D; ð12Þ
where ri,d,t is the excess return of stock i (in excess of the
market return) on day d in month t, vi,d,t is the dollar
volume (in millions of dollars) for stock i on day d in
month t, and Dt is the number of trading days in month t.
The coefficient ηi,t measures the expected return reversal
for a given dollar volume, controlling for lagged excess
stock returns. For a less liquid stock, ηi,t is expected to be
negative and large in magnitude.
Two filters are imposed when computing the liquidity
measure in each month: A stock has at least 15 observa-
tions in any given month; and a stock has a share price
between $5 and $1,000 at the end of the previous month.
The market liquidity measure in month t is then calculated
as the average liquidity measure across individual stocks
ηt ¼∑Nti ¼ 1ηi;t=Nt , where Nt is the number of stocks avail-
able in that month. Because the size of the equity market
increases over time, the liquidity measure is scaled by
market size at the beginning of the Center for Research in
Security Prices daily sample, i.e., Lm;t ¼ ðmt=m1Þnηt , where
mt is the total market value of all sample stocks at the end
of month t−1 and month 1 refers to August 1962.
As ηi,t measures the liquidity cost of trading $1 million
of stock i, the scaled market liquidity measure Lm,t can be
interpreted as the average liquidity cost at time t of trading
$1 million in 1962 stock market dollars distributed equally
across all stocks. Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) find that
the average (median) value of market liquidity during
1962–1999 is −0.03 (−0.02), suggesting the cost of such a
trade is 2–3%. The scaled aggregate market liquidity
measure, Lm,t, is used in our evaluation of liquidity-
timing skill for hedge funds.
Amihud (2002) measures stock illiquidity as the average
ratio of the daily absolute return to the dollar trading volume.
This measure can be interpreted as the price impact per
million dollars of daily trading volume, or the daily price
impact of the order flow, and is expected to be positive.
The illiquidity of stock i in month t, ILLIQit ;is defined as
ILLIQit ¼
1
Di;t
∑
Di;t
d ¼ 1
jRitdj
vitd
; ð13Þ
where Dt is the number of trading days in month t, and R
i
td
and vitd are the return and dollar volume (in millions) of stock
i on day d in month t. We follow Acharya and Pedersen (2005)
to construct a normalized Amihud measure of illiquidity,
cit ;using the equation
cit ¼minð0:25þ 0:30ðmt=m1ÞnILLIQit ; 30:00Þ; ð14Þwhere mt/m1 is the scaling factor defined in the same way as
in the Pástor and Stambaugh measure; the parameters 0.25
and 0.30 are chosen such that the normalized illiquidity for
size-decile portfolios has a similar distribution to the effective
half spread; and the normalized illiquidity is capped at 30% to
eliminate outliers. Finally, we construct a measure of market
illiquidity, ct, as the equal-weighted average of the illiquidity
measures of individual stocks on the NYSE and Amex:
ct ¼
1
Nt
∑
Nt
i ¼ 1
cit ; ð15Þ
where Nt is the number of stocks in month t. We interpret the
Amihud market illiquidity measure as the average price
impact of $1 million trade in 1962 stock market dollars
distributed equally across stocks.
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